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Abstract 
The thesis undertakes an examination of certain Soviet 
problems which upon analysis serve to support the views of 
publicists such as Richard Nixon, Richard Pipes, Edward Luttwak, 
Paul Nitze, and Eugene Rostow. These experts argue that the 
Soviet Union is bent on a course of world hegemony. The 
objective of the thesis is to determine if the Soviet leader-
ship is under lateral pressure to expand. Two propositions 
underline the broad theme of the thesis: that the Soviet 
Union is the de facto Russian empire, with the same concerns, 
i.e. stability and Russian domination; that real arms restraint 
on the part of the United States has given the Kremlin a 
"window of opportunity" in which to exploit its military 
superiority. The thesis is composed of chapters examining 
traditional influences on Soviet foreign behaviour, the place 
of the Soviet Union in the International State system, the 
internal problems of the USSR, the major external threat 
[Chinal to the Soviet Union, and a final chapter on Soviet Global 
strategy, tactics, and possible courses of action. The study 
may contribute to the understanding of motivating factors in 
Soviet foreign behaviour in the '80s, given its military 
superiority and consistent pattern of foreign behaviour, whether 
Tsarist or Soviet. It therefore follows that this study may 
also contribute to alerting those who refuse to accept that the 
United States and hence the West, is seriously vulnerable to 
probable Soviet foreign policy options in the early '80s. 
Int roduction 
Given the present global situation with its recurring 
crises and dislocations, there is a tendency on the part of 
some to view the global order as one out of control. This 
lack of control, or agreed upon rules of procedure and 
behaviour, is often considered to be the result either of a 
lack of clear foreign policy objectives on the part of certain 
major actors, or the result of the actors reacting "willy-
nilly" to a series of so-called unforeseen crises. Hence, 
foreign behaviour is seen to be incrementalist in that it is 
seen as a reaction to problems as they arise rather than as 
the pursuit and fulfillment, over time, of a set of desired 
obj ectives. 
In opposition to the incrementalists we will argue 
that Soviet foreign policy and behaviour have been the result 
of certain concrete objectives—pursued over time and bridging 
both Tsarist and Soviet regimes. The pursuit of these ob-
jectives has been necessitated by a series of internal and 
external exigencies. Thus, Soviet foreign behaviour is 
largely an outcome of the reaction to these perceived exi-
gencies on the part of Soviet elites. A good deal of inter-
national behaviour is then the result of not only one nation's 
interactions with others, but rather the result of behaviour 
patterns and attributes within the nation itself. 
J. Wilkenfeld (ed.), Conflict Behaviour and Linkage 
Politics (New York: David McKay Co., 1973), p. 7. 
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In our discussion we will proceed along the lines of 
a descriptive historical analysis; it is not that we are 
adverse to the application of certain analytical models but 
are rather cautioned by the story of Kierkegaard's man who 
lived his life in abstractions--he had abstracted himself to 
such an extent that one morning he woke up to find that he 
had died some time ago. 
The focus of this paper will be on the USSR as a 
Russian empire, and how internal difficulties in maintaining 
Russian domination will result in foreign policy outputs. 
We will attempt to demonstrate that the Soviet government will 
feel compelled, like its Tsarist predecessors, to resort 'to 
external expansionism to secure the empire. 
Our examination will look at the three most serious 
internal exigencies, and the dominant external threat, which 
threatens the domination of the "Great Russian" Slav over the 
Soviet Union. The internal problem areas are: (1) the 
legitimacy crisis of the C.P.S.U.; (2) the problem of non-
Russian minorities within the Soviet Union; and (3) increasing 
Soviet-economic dislocations. Simultaneously, the external 
threat is posed by China. The first three of these are, of 
course, problems leading to what may be termed "lateral 
pressures," [see appendix], while the last exigency is direct--
its ramifications challenge the internal stability of the 
Soviet Union. 
Before entering a discussion of our four major problem 
3 
areas, as cited above, we need to briefly examine (1) the 
Geographical, Historical, and Cultural influences on Soviet 
foreign behaviour and (2) the perspective of the elite on the 
place of the USSR in the International State System. These 
factors will influence the understanding and perception which 
the Soviet elite has of those pressures which we see as 
leading to patterns of Soviet foreign behaviour. 
Crucial to our argument is the demonstration that the 
analytical components of what has been called the "New I.R." 
no longer hold. The premises of this are: 
1. Both powers must possess nuclear arms and 
must, furthermore, keep their arms at a 
level to match the other side's capabilities; 
2. Both sides must accept the concept of non 
use of the nuclear arms; and 
3. Military victory is useless. 
Instead, we now find that the Soviets are fast approaching 
a first-strike capability and as a consequence the old notions 
of brinkmanship no longer pertain. If this is so, Americans 
also will no longer be able to operate according to the pre-
cepts of "New I.R.". Thus Rostow warns: 
Many tend to dismiss the vision of nuclear 
war as unthinkable. But the vision of 
Soviet political coercion backed by over-
whelming nuclear and conventional forces 
is so far from unthinkable as to have 
become a likely possibility, thanks to 
the drift of American foreign and defense 
policies in the post-Viet Nam period.2 
Eugene V. Rostow, "The Case Against SALT II,:' 
Commentary, Feb. '79, p. 23. 
4 
Therefore the Soviets have achieved a "window of 
opportunity;" hence, if a goal can best be attained through 
the use of military force, they may feel secure in pursuing 
those means to that end. [The nature of this "window," and 
military capabilities of the USSR are dealt with in some 
depth in Chapter II.] 
We will argue, that for the Kremlin now, given its 
present military superiority, not to seek actively to attenuate 
its problems (present and future) would be to mark a radical 
departure in foreign behaviour whether Tsarist or Soviet. 
In the post-World War II era many academic circles 
argued that the use of force by either superpower against the 
other or against smaller parties was doomed to failure. This 
view gained credence by the failure of American armed forces 
in the Viet Nam war. Washington, which had accepted that 
military force was ineffective and suicidal against the USSR, 
drew the lesson from Viet Nam that military force would be 
3 
doomed to failure "in a world of aroused nationalism." Once 
this view had gained ascendancy there was little alarm (in 
official circles) over the massive Soviet arms build-up which 
accelerated unabated during the seventies. The prevalent 
attitude was that all the Soviets could achieve would be a 
4 
"more costly plateau of impotence." 
Edward N. Luttwak, "After Afghanistan, What?," 
Commentary, April '80, p. 40 
5 
This air of relative nonchalance in the face of the 
USSR's ever-increasing war making ability, was reinforced 
by experts such as George Kennan (widely recognized as the 
Dean of U.S. Kremlin watchers) who argued that the Soviet 
Union had become a status quo power. Hence, the intentions 
of Soviet leaders were viewed as basically moderate and 
peaceful. 
Unfortunately for the west these views remained in 
ascendency even while the USSR went about gobbling up the 
old Portuguese empire, using proxy troops supplied with Soviet 
arms and advisers. The Kremlin soon demonstrated how in-
terested it was in the status quo in Angola, Ethiopia, and 
Indochina. 
Perhaps the most damaging effect these views had led 
to, has been the acceptance in Washington of the Vance-
Shulman school which held that "because the internal situation 
of the USSR is weak, there is nothing to worry about in 
Soviet behaviour. All the evidence, however, points to the 
conclusion that the weaknesses of the regime act as a power-
ful spur to action." What the followers of the Vance and 
Shulman school chose to overlook is that dictators in possession 
of large armies and small civil success are easily tempted to 
go to war. As Kahler notes in a well-received article: 
Brian Crozier, "Moscow's Strategic Speed-up for 1979," 
Soviet Analyst, Vol. 8 No. 1, 11 Jan. '79. 
The greatest incentive to risk-taking 
is present when the internal prospects 
do not foreclose action altogether but 
are bad enough to encourage a foreign 
move that might aid in consolidation, 
particularly when this perception is 
coupled with an international setting 
that can still be challenged but with 
declining probability of success.6 
Kahler goes on to draw the ominous parallel between 1980 and 
1914; these sets of perceptions shared by the elites of 
Austria-Hungary and Germany then, could be held by the Soviet 
elite today. 
This paper will argue that the equation of: short-
term military optimism (i.e. "Window of Opportunity") plus 
long-term national pessimism (i.e. internal and external 
exigencies) will add up to probable Soviet expansion in the 
early 1980s. This combination of internal and external 
exigencies leading the Soviet elites to seek expansion, com-
bined with a "window of opportunity" provides circumstances 
which are highly conducive to the traditional, historical 
drive of Moscow's expansionism. 
We have approached this paper as an exercise in 
strengthening the arguments of those who seek to warn us that 
the Soviet Union is actively pursuing a course towards world 
hegemony. Therefore our argument is very much a "worst case 
approach." Our analysis of Soviet problems, behaviour and 
intentions is thus necessarily one-sided. This paper will 
Miles Kahler, "Rumors of War: The 1914 Analogy," 
Foreign Affairs, Winter 79/80. 
E.N. Luttwak, "After Afghanistan, What?," op. cit., 
p . 46 . 
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incorporate the arguments of such analysts and publicists as 
Sir John Hackett, Richard Nixon, Richard Pipes, Paul Nitze, 
Eugene Rostow, Edward Luttwak, but its significance and 
contribution will be in encompassing their arguments with an 
analysis of the underlying problems in the Soviet Union which 
serves to support these views about Soviet motives and in-
tentions. The entire exercise is predicated on the existence 
of a Soviet "Window of Opportunity" or that the Soviet elites 
have a reason to believe they can act as if they have one. 
The final section of the paper will examine Soviet 
strategy, tactics, and possible scenarios based on our "worst 
case approach" analysis of Soviet intentions. Soviet foreign 
behaviour will be projected on the basis of trends in their 
behaviour currently and our perception of their goals. These 
goals being courses of action which provide for the maintenance 
of the d_e facto Russian Empire. 
Chapter I: Traditional Influences on 
Soviet Foreign Behaviour 
Geography and History 
Geography and Fate have made it 
vulnerable to attack, and experience 
has impelled it to rely upon internal 
authoritarianism and external 
expansionism for defense. 
Aspaturian 
Fate gave Russia space, and Russians have prided them-
selves on their vast distances; however, Russia is only 
2 
Moscow. Moscow, with an iron hand, has kept territories and 
conquered peoples on a tight leash. The realities of their 
geographic position, have been the most permanent conditioning 
factors on the foreign behaviour of both the Russian Empire 
and the Soviet Union. Geography simplified the conquest ,of a 
divided Russia, but it also simplified the expansion of a 
3 
unified Russian state. A powerful Russian state could expand 
in all directions until checked by superior force; a weak 
Russia invited attack, on occasion, from more than one direc-
tion at once. 
Through much of her history Russia suffered the constant 
threat of invasion and the ravages of war as she had no natural 
V. Aspaturian, "The Foreign Policy of the Soviet 
Union," in Rosenau, J.N., Thompson, K.W., and Boyd, G. World 
Politics (New York: Free Press, 1976), p. 57. 
2 
Both symbolically and in real terms, Moscow represents 
Russia; in close proximity are much of the population and 
indus try. 
3 
V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Foreign Policy," in Macridis, 
R.D., (ed.) Foreign Policy in World Politics (Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976), p. 164. 
9 
boundary on the West or, until the 18th and 19th centuries, 
on the East or South. The past weaknesses of the Russian 
frontier invited numerous invasions: more than one hundred 
and fifty foreign invasions during the European Renaissance 
(13th to the 15th centuries), and ten major wars, with 
Sweden and Poland in the 17th and 18th centuries, the 
Napoleonic Wars and the Crimean and Russo-Turk wars, in the 
19th century, and, the Russo-Japanese and the two World Wars 
4 
during the first half of the 20th century. 
The first one-third of its entire history the Russians 
were under the Mongol-Tartar yoke. For century after century 
Mongols, Swedes, Poles, Lithuanians, French and Germans made 
devastating incursions into Russia, even to the point of 
burning the capital, Moscow. The memory of these disasters 
and national humiliations has been preserved in the great-
power instinct of the people, to whom their imperialism seems 
a strictly defensive phenomenon, not an aggressive one. 
Hence, whether Russian expansionism has been aggressive or 
defensive in nature is merely academic. As Aspaturian notes: 
In the absence of more obvious geographic 
obstacles to her enemies, Russia's physical 
security became irrevocably attached to 
land space, while her psychological security 
became inseparable from political centrali-
zation . 5 
Thus, the foreign behaviour of both the Tsarist and 
Soviet administrations has been characterized by military 
4 
M. Schwartz, The Foreign Policy of the U.S.S.R.: 
Domestic Factors (Riverside: Dickenson Pub. Co., 1975), p. 75. 
V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Foreign Policy," p. 164. 
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intervention and expansion for the defense of perceived 
Russian interests. 
The creation by Stalin of a belt of 
satellite states in Eastern Europe in the 
aftermath of the Second World War is very 
much a part of this tradition, as is the 
recent Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. 
Anxiety regarding the future of Russian 
influence in Eastern Europe led Brezhnev 
in 1968--much as it had Nicholas I in 1831 
regarding Poland--to adopt a policy of 
military intervention.6 
The Russian historical experience of numerous foreign 
invasions of their country helped shape the highly centralized 
character of Tsarist rule. The Russians had traditionally 
"seen themselves facing a choice of unity under an autocrat 
or subjugation by a foreign power." Historically, this kind 
of rule was justified by the fact that there could be no 
society without the government's complete control of all men 
and resources. The national character became one of defensive 
reaction. The whole of Russia's diplomatic history con-
sisted of dealing with unfriendly neighbours. Russia had little 
experience in friendly relations and her diplomacy was con-
cerned with impressing an adversary with Russian strength and 
massiveness in size, as Kennan noted, "impressing an adversary 
Q 
with the terrifying strength of Russian power...." 
The territorial integrity of Russia's historic borders 
M. Schwartz, The Foreign Policy ...., op. cit., p. 164. 
C. Black, "The Limitation of Strategic Arms," Part I, 
p. 6 quoted in M. Schwartz, The Foreign Policy ...., op. cit., 
p. 75. 
G. Kennan, Memoi rs, p. 560 quoted in M. Schwartz, 
The Foreign Policy ...., op. cit., p. 76. 
11 
and the acute sensitivity to the vulnerability of the western 
border became permanent policy objectives for any Russian-
Soviet regime--i.e. Stalin's end-of-World War II regathering 
of lands campaign. Since 1939, the Soviet Union has annexed 
four of its former neighbours, seized territory from seven 
9 
more, and has made territorial demands upon two others; most 
of this territory was previously lost by a weakened Russia. 
The post-World War II settlement in the region placed the 
Soviet Union "in a position which resembled, at least in terms 
of geography, that which existed between 1721 and 1809." 
The international behaviour of the Soviet Union has 
been consistent with that of its Tsarist predecessors. Russia 
had a strong imperial tradition; her Tsars created a great 
empire and aimed it at world conquest. Russia's history between 
the 15th and 20th centuries is one of enormous expansion. 
From Tsar to Commissar, the character of Russian expansion has 
changed little. 
Those instruments and rationalization of 
imperial Russia's expansion, the ethnic 
argument, Panslavism, even the Orthodoxy 
were all to find their place in the arsenal 
of Soviet Russia's foreign policy. By 
1945, the goal of the Tsar's government 
had striven for but never achieved was 
fulfilled by their successors: Eastern 
Europe was under the full domination of 
Russia. The ethnic frontiers of Germany 
were pushed back to where they had been in 
the Middle Ages. Though committed officially 
to atheism, Stalin's government repressed the 
Greek Catholic rite in Eastern Galicia and 
East Prussia, Bessarabia-Bukovina, Moldavia, Finno-Karelia, 
Southern Sakhalin, the Kuriles, Eastern Poland (Western Ukraine) 
Carpatho-Ukraine (Ruthenia). 
C. Black, "The Pattern of Russian Objectives," in 
Lederer, I.J. (ed.) Russian Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1962), p. 8. 
12 
extended its efforts on behalf of the 
Orthodox Church, just as Nicholas I's 
government had done in the empire's 
western domains in the 1830s and 1840s. 
The potential sources of irredentism were 
removed when all the Ukrainians and 
Byelorussians were included in the USSR. 
These factors are eloquent in themselves 
as evidence of the strong continuity 
between old and new regimes.H 
Russian and Soviet territorial expansion has had three 
objectives as its basis: strategic, economic, and nationalistic. 
Russia's preoccupation with security could best be handled by 
reducing or eliminating the political power of neighbouring 
states through military force, and extending Russia's frontiers 
to natural barriers such as oceans, deserts, and mountains, or to 
long stretches of sparsely inhabited borderlands of little 
geopolitical interest to other major powers. 
Economic interests are directly related to security 
interests and "on no subject has there been more general agree-
ment among Russian and [Soviet] leaders than on the importance 
12 
of economic strength to national security." Economic 
interests dictated Russia acquire access to open seas, as an 
outlet for trade. Peter the Great built St. Petersburg towards 
this end, and to prevent the domination of the Baltic region by 
another great power. He accomplished this by: "annexing 
territories inhabited by non-Russians, by encouraging a policy 
of neutrality on the part of the states of this region, and by 
exerting strong pressure on these states when they allied 
A. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence (New York: Praeger 
Pub., 1974), p. 12. 
12 
C. Black, 'The Pattern of Russian Objectives," 
op. cit., p. 14. 
13 
,,13 themselves with other great powers.""" From St. Petersburg, 
Russia acquired security for its economic interests: it 
ensured an outlet for trade with the West. The Soviet 
Union's attack on Finland in November 1939 can be understood 
in terms of Moscow's continuing security interest in the area 
to defend against the Nazi threat to Leningrad. Stalin felt 
it imperative to create greater strength in depth, i.e. to 
move back the frontier from Leningrad. The end result of this 
action was Soviet expansion and annexation of a good part of 
Finland. 
Nationalistic interests motivating expansion have used 
religious, dynastic or nationality claims as the basis for 
conquests. Tsarist and Soviet regimes have felt a mandate to 
unify territories considered to be Russian by virtue of reasons 
cited above. The 14th and 15th centuries saw the grand princes 
of Moscow determined to unify the territories which had paid 
tribute to the Tartars. Later, Russian claims on Polish 
territory were based on the fact that much of the territory 
was inhabited by Ukrainians or Byelorussians who are close to 
the Great Russians in religion and language. Russian annexation 
was facilitated by the fact that "no upper or middle class had 
14 
as yet arisen to claim a national distinctness." 
The important question is whether Soviet expansion 
has ended, or whether there are still strong incentives for 
the Soviet leadership to expand and in what directions. 
13 
C. Black, "The Pattern of Russian Objectives, 
op. cit., p. 14. 
14 A. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, op. cit., p. 4. 
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Soviet preoccupation with regional security has important 
international ramifications because: "... regional security 
with respect to bordering states could in effect mean global 
security, because of the size and diversity of its economic 
base." We shall turn to some of these considerations shortly 
and deal in some depth with them in the final chapter. 
Cultural Influences on Russian and Soviet Foreign Policy 
Every ancient and deeply rooted 
self-contained culture, especially 
if it is spread over a wide part 
of the earth's surface, constitutes 
a self-contained world, full of 
riddles and surprises to Western 
thinking. 
Solzhenitsyn, 
A World Split Apart 
Certainly, some of Russia's conquests cannot be ex-
plained from an economic, political, strategic or any other 
reasonable point of view. Some expansion and imperialism can 
perhaps be understood in terms of how at varying times the 
Russians seem to have believed in a historical mission. One 
theory posited Moscow as a third Rome; in this theory Moscow 
was held to be the successor to Rome and Constantinople. 
Therefore Moscow became the heir to the imperial tradition of 
Rome, and the centre of the Christian world. 
Perhaps this grandiose conception of 
Moscow's role in history should be held 
to account in some degree for the vigor 
of Ivan's offensives against Tartar 
S.B. Cohen, Geography and Politics in a World Divided 
(New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1975), p. 191. 
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territories in the East and the Baltic 
provinces in the West, and also for his 
matrimonial ambitions, which included a 
proposal to Queen Elizabeth of England.16 
Another doctrine held that it was Russia's destiny to 
liberate all Slavic peoples and create a "federation embracing 
all the non-German peoples of Eastern and South Eastern Europe 
up to and including Constantinople. 
In the writings of Danilevskii, this 
ambitious objective was supported by 
a cyclical theory of history which 
maintained that Russia was destined 
to succeed Europe as the eleventh in 
a series of dominant civilizations of 
which Egypt was the first.18 
It is interesting to note that some of the great 
literary masters the Russians have produced were devout 
imperialists. Pushkin wrote a militaristic poem about the 
suppression of the Polish uprising of 1831, and the taking of 
Warsaw, by Russian troops. Dostoievsky yearned passionately 
for the conquest of Constantinople; Gogol was fiercely proud 
in his writing that his country covered such a huge expanse. 
That expanse was truly gigantic; in the fifteenth century the 
Duchy of Moscow comprised 15,000 square miles and by the jtime 
of the last Tsar, Nicholas II, the empire comprised 8.5 
.,,. . , 19 
million square mxles. 
16 
C. Black, "The Pattern of Russian Objectives," 
op. cit., p. 24. 
C. Black, "The Patterns of Russian Objectives," 
op. cit., p. 26. 
Ibid. , p. 26. 
19 
M. Schwartz, The Foreign Policy ...., op. cit., p. 73 
16 
Observers such as Friedrich Engels saw Russians as 
20 
"dreaming of world supremacy' and the French observer of 
nineteenth-century Russia, the Marquis de Custine stated "an 
immense ambition ferments in the hearts of the Russian people, 
That nation, essentially aggressive ... dreams of world 
A • - • » 2 1 domxnatxon. 
Culturally, Russia developed a distinctive and lasting 
self-image. Russia developed over the centuries a religious • 
and cultural self-conceit, convinced that its own religious 
22 
and political arrangements far surpassed all the others. 
It was long believed, as Dostoevsky observed, 
that close relations with the rest of Europe 
might even exercise a harmful and corrupt 
influence upon the Russian mind and the 
Russian idea; that it might distort Orthodoxy 
itself and lead Russia along the path to 
perdition.23 
This cultural self-conceit manifested itself in a belief in 
a higher spiritual historical mission of the Russian nation. 
Predating Peter's reign and going back to 
the earliest days of Muscovy, there is the 
notion of the historical mission of the 
Russian nation as the representative and 
defender of eastern Christianity as against 
Catholicism and also (and especially) as 
against Islam. The concrete expression of 
this mission was the goal of expelling 
Turkey from Europe and regaining Con- „ , 
stantinople and the straits for Christendom. 
20 
M. Schwartz, The Foreign Policy op. cit., p. 73. 
21 
Ibid., p. 7 3. 
22Ibid. , p. 78. 
23 
Ibid. , p. 7 7. 
o / 
A. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, op. cit., p. 12. 
17 
This self-image of superiority and historical contempt 
for the anti-Russian or foreign led to Russia's policy of 
condemning Europe and the West. Also, as Schwartz notes, 
"this exalted self-image gave rise to glorification of the 
state and governmental absolutism on the one hand, and a 
25 Messianic kind of imperialism on the other." 
The Bolsheviks became heirs to the Russian history and 
cultural legacy; they gave Russia new goals and aspirations 
but could not avoid the contours of a Russian state and falling 
2 6 
heir to the assets and liabilities of its predecessors. 
Certainly Marxist-Leninist ideology like any social creed 
assimilated different ideologies and social movements such as 
Slavic nationalism and the Russian notion of superior culture. 
The ideology was consistent with Russian messianic traditions 
... [it] reinforced the psychological obsession 
for security ... provided an ideological 
rationale for assuming the implacable hostility 
of the outside world and sanctified Russian 
expansion with the ethical mission of liberating 
the downtrodden masses of the world from 
their oppressors.27 
The ideology easily lent itself to the assimilation of tra-
ditional beliefs, goals, and objectives of Russian foreign 
behaviour. 
The hostile West of the Slavophiles became 
the hostility of capitalism and imperialism; 
instead of the parochial messianism of the 
M. Schwartz, The Foreign Policy ...., op. cit., 
p. 78. 
V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Foreign Policy," op. cit., 
p. 165. 
18 
pan-Slav enthusists, Marxism provided Russia 
with a mission of universal transcendence--
transforming the outside world into her own 
image, in fulfillment of her historic destiny 
and as the only permanent guarantee of 
absolute security.28 
Marxist-Leninism purports to be a scientifically 
determined ongoing process with unavoidable laws--thus its 
superiority and universal validity. The doctrine of pro-
letarian internationalism declared the potential interest of 
the Soviet Union in the domestic and foreign affairs of all 
other nations of the world. 
Like the rulers of Old Muscovy, they tend 
to see themselves as the bearers of a 
unique message and the center of a new, 
higher civilization. Now as in the past 
Moscow proclaims itself an example to 
all peoples.29 
* * * 
Traditionally, The Kremlin's masters, whether Tsarist 
or Soviet, have been expansionary. We have looked at the geo-
graphic, historical, and cultural influences on foreign 
behaviour and have found a marked continuity, i.e. expansion 
motivated by strategic, economic, and nationalistic objectives, 
which have characterized the old and new regimes. 
What directions and what rationalizations will the Kremlin 
be likely to adopt in furthering this historical drive of 
expansion? The leaders of the Kremlin are conscious of the 
socially useful aspect of a legitimizing rationale for the 
2 8 
V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Foreign Policy," op. cit., 
p. 165. 
2 9 
M. Schwartz, The Foreign Policy ...., op. cit., p. 82. 
19 
blatant use of force. In Eastern Europe the Brezhnev doctrine 
provides the legitimizing cover for the imperial role of the 
Red Army. Outside of Eastern Europe, on what grounds in the 
pursuit of which objectives will Soviet imperialism and 
territorial expansion be rationalized? 
Whatever the future territorial claims of 
the Soviet Union may be, their formal 
basis is likely to continue to be on 
nationality lines. Natural features and 
historic claims become objectives as they 
coincide with nationality frontiers.^ 
Given the far-ranging borders of the USSR and the 
many minorities encompassed within, who have strong ethnic 
ties to peoples in bordering states, the Kremlin has its grounds 
for territorial expansion. What for previous regimes had been 
the historical mission of uniting the Slavic peoples, has been 
expanded to a mandate to unite the peoples of the USSR with 
their ethnic cousins. The obvious paradox is that expansion 
on this basis would lead to the territorial expansion of the 
Soviet Union over much of the World. Marxist-Leninist 
ideology dictates that most of the governments of the world are 
not legitimate, therefore once the Soviet Union is strong 
enough it can rationalize "liberating" peoples unfairly 
living under imperialist governments. 
It is likely that Soviet expansion will occur along 
the periphery of the USSR. 
30 
S.B. Cohen, Geography and Politics ...., op. cit., 
p. 204. 
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For a brief period (1723-32), all of the 
southern shore of the Caspian Sea was 
held by Russia. Soviet interests have been 
somewhat more restricted, to date, encouraging 
separatist movements in Persian Azerbaijan 
and in Kurdish Iranian areas south and west 
of Lake Urmia. From such positions, Turkey 
would be hemmed in on two sides, and northern 
Iraq would be directly exposed to the Soviet 
Union.31 
Soviet territorial expansion in this area under the facade of 
nationalistic and historical claims, would really be furthering 
the economic interests of the USSR. From such a position the 
Soviets would be given a position to exert political 
pressure of almost undeniable magnitude on the Persian Gulf 
States. This position would also facilitate a military inter-
vention in the Gulf if the Soviet leaders adopt that option. 
Certainly, however, the overriding bases for the 
Kremlin's imperialism under the old and new regimes have been 
strategic. Today, age-old fears of the east are represented 
by China. China easily provides the analogy for the Russian 
fear of the yellow-skinned men (the Mongols) who ruled her 
for 300 years. As a reaction to this sense of threat, the 
Kremlin has increased its aggressiveness toward China, its 
possible allies, and the nations that border it. 
Expansion and military intervention by the Kremlin 
in the Middle East and against China in the near term is both 
consistent and probable given our understanding of the motives 
for traditional Russian and Soviet expansionism. The final 
chapter will deal with probable Soviet expansionism. 
31 
S.B. Cohen, Geography and Politics op. cit., 
p. 204. 
Chapter II: Place of the USSR in the 
International System 
Today, there is no question of any 
significance which can be decided without 
the Soviet Union or in opposition to it 
... Moreover, it is precisely our 
proposals ... that are the center of 
political discussions. 
A.A. Gromyko 
at the XXIVth Party Congress 
(1971)1 
With the change in Soviet status (international recogni-
tion as a superpower) the traditional dilemma of physical 
security and the traditional stance of inferiority were altered 
and erased respectively. However, the crucial element in 
the modern Soviet perception lies in the degree to which and 
the way in which traditional habits of mind, policy postures 
and priorities are modified, if at all, to suit the present-
day reality. Certainly, Gromyko's boast at the XXIV Party 
Congress is grounded in fact; it therefore becomes significant 
how the Soviet elite views the internatinna] system and in 
particular the nuclear relationship with the U.S. 
The Soviet ideological prism reflects an 
image of the world that is virtually un-
recognizable to a non-Communist, yet it is 
on this image that Soviet foreign policy 
is based... This image is accepted as the 
real world by Soviet leaders.2 
Quoted in Richard Pipes, "Detente: Moscow's View," 
Soviet Strategy in Europe, ed. R. Pipes (New York: Crane, 
Russak & Co. Inc., 1976), p. 3. 
2 
V. Aspaturian in R.C. Macridis, Foreign Policy in 
World Politics, op. cit., p. 165. 
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The Communist view of the international system is 
basically simple. No other regimes have, in principle, any 
right to exist. The reason why Soviet elites have had to 
accept the Western Capitalist dominated system, however un-
willingly, lies in the reality of the situation--that is, 
that the Soviet Union has never been strong enough to challenge 
the world as a whole and has had to "recognize" this state 
3 
system, much as it has had to recognize the Soviet Union. 
Detente 
Opponents of detente with the Soviets argue, that for 
the Kremlin, dgtente is a means of avoiding nuclear war, while 
the Soviet Union goes about pursuing its long-term objectives. 
Detente then is seen as a framework of relationships within 
which the USSR "can better pursue an advantageous balance of 
military power and exploit the most vulnerable areas of dis-
content and turbulence in the world." Detente in no way 
therefore precludes Soviet efforts to acquire more and more 
clients and thereby slowly weaken the United States, until 
the U.S. is so weakened and isolated that it will accept the 
position of an ineffectual actor on the world stage. 
3 
As Robert Conquest notes: "... no non-Communist regime 
is in principle legitimate, and in the long run all must be 
destroyed ... questions of tactical possibility make the tem-
porary acceptance of non-Communist states a necessary historical 
compromise." R. Conquest, "Why the Soviet Elite is different 
from us," in Atlantic Monthly Quarterly, Vol. 16 #1, p. 72. 
Robert E. Osgoode, "The East-West Global Equilibrium," 
The Atlantic Community Quarterly, summer of '79, p. 144. 
W.M. Jones, "Soviet Leadership Politics and Leader-
ship Views on the Use of Military Force," Rand, July '79, p. 18. 
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Detente is also seen to have provided the Soviets with 
the opportunity of channelling increasing amounts of resources 
to the armaments sector while yet increasing to some degree 
resources utilized by the consumer sector. In short, the 
Soviets have been able to circumvent the strict economic 
choice of guns at the expense of butter. Detente then is 
conceded by its opponents in the West to have been a brilliant 
tactical stroke on the part of the Soviet elite. Western 
funds and technology served to stabilize the Soviet system and thus, 
directly or indirectly, boosted the Soviet Union's military 
potential. On this point it is interesting to recall the 
famous dialogue between Lenin and Radek. 
Lenin: "Comrades don't panic, when things 
go very hard for us, we will give 
a rope to the bourgeoisie, and the 
bourgeoisie will hang itself." 
Radek: "Vladimir Ilyich, but where are we 
going to get enough rope to hang 
the whole bourgeoisie?" 
Lenin: "They'll supply us with it." 
Sixty years later, a western observer might well add 
"Plus 5a change, plus c'est la meme chose." The defence-
heavy industry complex is the most modern societal sector with 
a greater concentration of scientific, technological, managerial 
talent and labor skill than any other sector of the Soviet 
economy. This was in part made possible by the competition 
In the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, Soviet armed 
forces had to use some of Moscow's transit buses, while in the 
case of their recent invasion of Afghanistan, other than air 
transport they were able to use trucks from a Ford built plant 
Quoted in Carl Gersham "Selling them the Rope," 
Commentary, April '79, p. 35. 
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among Western interests in providing credits and technological 
know-how to a regime with the avowed determination to someday 
aid and preside in the downfall of the economic and political 
system of the West. 
The rationale by which the West entered a period of 
relaxed tension and cooperation was based on three goals: 
(1) to provide an atmosphere which would lead to a slow-down 
in the arms race; (2) to provide an atmosphere where the Soviet 
Union would curtail its imperialmeddling in the affairs of 
other states; (3) to provide an atmosphere which would be 
conducive for the Soviet elite to liberalize the state's re-
Q 
pression of dissidents. It was hoped and believed that 
detente would lead to a freer and better-informed Soviet 
Union, willing to compromise and liberalize in order to receive 
awards for meritorious behavior. The reality of the situation 
has been that Soviet negotiators easily played off Western 
interests and received credits, and technology for minimal 
concessions on the part of the Kremlin. 
Moscow has had considerable success in dispelling fears 
in the West that its military build-up is not greater than 
its legitimate defensive needs. The Kremlin is realistically 
apprehensive with China on one border and NATO on the other 
(given the tragic historic experience of numerous foreign 
invasions, their paranoia is understandable). The Kremlin 
Q 
See, D.K. Simes, "Detente, Russian Style," Foreign 
Policy, No. 32, Fall of *78. 
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is well aware that arms restraint on the part of the U.S. 
government has helped enable the USSR to reach parity in 
strategic nuclear arms and superiority in conventional arms. 
Certainly, arms limitation talks with the U.S., while per-
haps providing some rationality to the arms race, have done 
little to limit the creation of ever-more numerous weapons 
for the Soviet armed forces. 
... the share absorbed by the defense 
sector of the Soviet Gross National Product 
has grown from some 12-13 per cent in 1970 
to perhaps as much as 18 per cent in 1980; 
... Incidentally, in the same period 
(1970-79), U.S. defense expenditures as 
a share of the GNP have declined from 
7.5 per cent to 4.6 per cent, and in 
constant 1972 dollars, from $85.1 to 
65.0 Billion.9 
While the West can appreciate what it perceives as the 
defensive motivations for the Soviet arms build-up, it might 
have realized that: 
The Soviet Union cannot conceivably satisfy 
its ambitions to be immune from foreign 
threats both real and imagined, without 
gaining a decisive preponderance over its 
potential opponents.10 
While the superpowers reached essential equivalence in 
the early 1970s the Kremlin has continued to enhance the 
military capability of the Soviet Union. The single most 
important factor in this continued arms build-up has been the 
realization that the Soviet Union's recognition as a super-
power rests solely on its military capability. As Simes notes: 
"Soviet Defense Expenditure in the Era of SALT," 
U.S. Strategic Institute Report 79-1 (Washington, D.C. 1979), 
pp. 10-11. 
D.K. Simes, "Detente, Russian Style," op. cit., p. 49 
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Economically, the Soviet Union is no match 
for the U.S. The international appeal of 
Soviet-style communism is on the decline. 
Consequently, to ask the Soviets to refrain 
from "excessive" military build-up is to 
ask them to refrain from being a superpower. 
The Soviet elite have not been impressed by Western 
demands that they cease interfering in the affairs of "Third 
World" states; this is seen as crass hypocricy. The West has 
a long history of interference in the affairs of African 
nations especially. However, there does seem to be a pattern 
to Soviet adventurism in Africa--namely to exert political and 
military pressure to deny access to the West of oil from the 
Persian Gulf and vital mineral resources from South Africa. 
It is obvious that Moscow retains the perception of 
the U.S. as its competitor in a serious struggle of resources 
and political will; as one analyst noted: 
It is particularly disturbing that the 
USSR is pursuing a strategy apparently 
designed to deny the U.S. access to such 
areas as the Persian Gulf, which are crucial 
to American security ...12 
The issue of human rights is seen by the Kremlin as 
having a serious ulterior motive. Moscow perceives it as being 
in direct contradiction to its interpretation of the spirit 
of detente; that is, a relaxation of tensions in areas where 
either side feels its vital interests are in jeopardy. Carter's 
emphasis on human rights is perceived by the Soviet elite to be 
D.K. Simes, "Detente, Russian Style," op. cit., p. 51. 
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a challenge to the very survival of the regime and its inter-
national prestige. Thus, as Simes notes: 
Carter's application of particularly strong 
language toward the Soviet Union - while some 
states escaped criticism on human rights for 
reasons of political expediency - did nothing 
to enhance the credibility of Washington's 
moral offensive in the eyes of the Soviet elite 13 
A New Cold War 
Contention over the human rights crusade of the new 
Carter administration led to the visible deterioration of 
relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
Carter vociferously hammered away at the Soviets for their 
treatment of political dissidents. He punished them by the 
cancellation of the sale of a high-technology computer and 
imposed presidential control over future exports of oil tech-
nology. These moves infuriated Brezhnev and the Soviet elite, 
and led them to doubt Carter's commitment to their perception 
of detente. These doubts were substantiated in the Soviet 
eyes by subsequent actions of the Carter administration. 
The Kremlin watched as the SALT II debate became a 
vehicle for American hawks to win commitments for increased 
arms expenditures. The Kremlin's offer of Oct. 7/79 to 
negotiate new reductions in Europe was ignored, and their 
threats regarding the deployment of theater missiles in Europe 
were also ignored. They had to watch as the U.S. moved con-
tinually closer to China, finally offering Peking the trade 
13 D.K. Simes, "Detente, Russian Style," op. cit., p. 57 
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terms that Moscow had long coveted and long been denied. 
The invasion of Afghanistan, the opponents of detente 
hope, will prove to be a major watershed in U.S.-Soviet 
relations. They argue the invasion signified a major change 
in the Kremlin's perception of the value of "detente." 
Prior to this invasion it appeared that the Soviet elite was 
content to use military power as a fulcrum for political 
influence but not up to the point of risking a confrontation 
which would seriously shake the foundations of detente. 
They see the Kremlin with this move indicating they no longer 
need rewards from the U.S. for suitable behaviour nor do they 
fear punishment from the U.S. 
Western "hawks" believe the invasion indicates that 
the Kremlin perceives the balance of power as having shifted 
favourably in Moscow's direction. However, it is by no means 
self-evident that the invasion of Afghanistan was the start 
of a carefully planned movement aimed at direct control by 
the USSR of any Middle Eastern oil producing country, or even 
at the more limited target of an Indian Ocean port. Many 
observers interpret it as primarily a defensive move, in two 
senses: (1) it may have been intended to cut off the Central 
Asian republics of the USSR from any infection by Islamic 
nationalism. If the Moslem insurgents had eventually been 
victorious over a Soviet-backed regime in Afghanistan, this 
might have given Uzbecks and Tadzhiks in the USSR dangerous 
ideas; (2) it may have been intended to forestall any 
possibility of severe damage to the USSR's prestige through 
a loss of control and influence in Afghanistan. 
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These considerations could have been enough to out-
weigh the expected political and economic costs of Western 
and Third World reaction, especially when relations with the 
U.S.A. had deteriorated anyway. The possibility that at 
some later date there would be an opportunity to extend the 
USSR's influence decisively in the Middle East, may simply 
have been an added but marginal attraction. 
Strategists such as Georgetown's Edward Luttwak, argue 
that even if the invasion was motivated by defensive concerns 
on the part of the Kremlin, the ramifications for states in 
the area and for the West are very serious. Traditionally 
as the Russian Empire has expanded "new layers of insecurity 
that must be remedied by further expansion are invariably 
found."14 
In strictly military terms, the occupation of 
Afghanistan has provided the Soviets with bases from which: 
... Soviet fighter-bombers could now 
interdict at will the vital traffic of oil 
tankers entering and leaving the Gulf;... 
Soviet land-based aircraft could now 
neutralize the air-power superiority that the 
U.S. would otherwise enjoy in the immediate 
area by virtue of its naval aviation on 
board the great aircraft carriers. l-> 
Therefore, Luttwak argues, whatever the motivation for the 
invasion of Afghanistan the fait ac compli has dealt a serious 
blow to American strength overall. Any further expansion by 
E.N. Luttwak, "After Afghanistan, What?," Commentary, 
April 1980, p. 43. 
Ibid., p. 4 3. 
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the Soviets into the Indian Ocean area, he believes, will 
probably originate from Southern Afghanistan across the 
deserts of Baluchistan. This route is more practical for 
the Soviets than through their common border with Turkey, 
Kurdistan, or Iran, since these areas would be populated 
by 50 million inhabitants. Also, as Luttwak warns, the 
Soviet Union has increased its powers of political persuasion 
on the Gulf states merely by its proximity and enhanced 
capability. He states: 
While hatred of the Soviet Union has no 
doubt increased, so has fear, and great 
military empires do not ordinarily seek 
love but rather the anxious respect that 
fear can best inspire. 16 
It is probable that the Kremlin was confident that th 
U.S. would not react with an extreme response (to their 
December '79 invasion of Afghanistan) since in August of 197 
the U.S. administration had failed to get Soviet troops out 
of a country much closer to the U.S., i.e. Cuba. Mr. Carter 
and Secretary Vance had stated "the status quo is unacceptab 
however two months later President Carter was on national 
television to say in essence that the status quo was accepta 
The crisis turned out to be a non-crisis, but the damage to 
the balance of power and perceived U.S. strength of will was 
cons iderable. 
The Soviets must have noted the lack of unity in the 
West in the weeks after the initial capture of the U.S. Emba 
16 E.N. Luttwak, "After Afghanistan, What?," op. cit., 
p. 43. 
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in Iran, and probably felt they could gamble that Afghanistan 
would not lead to U.S. allies denying the credits and tech-
nology they need. The combination of events and the per-
ception of the Carter administration as weak, may have served 
to convince the Kremlin that the U.S. lacks the resolve to 
confront the Soviet Union. If this is the case,then the 
Kremlin's invasion of Afghanistan probably indicates the 
Soviets intend to capitalize on opportunities to do so. 
Soviet motives then, behind the invasion, are perhaps not as 
significant as the fact that the Kremlin sees itself as 
strong enough to risk jettisoning the framework of detente. 
It is instructive then to heed the warnings of Aleksander 
Solzhenitsyn; if his views correspond to those of the men in 
the Kremlin, then we can better understand why Moscow may 
feel it can exploit perceived advantages. 
... a decline in courage is particularly 
noticeable among the ruling and intellectual 
elites, causing an impression of a loss of 
courage by the entire society... Must one 
point out that from ancient times a decline 
in courage has been considered the first 
symptom of the end?l' 
Solzhenitsyn believes a cult of material well-being has sapped 
the strength of Americans, that Americans are not prepared to 
risk their lives to defend themselves or their interests. 
Therefore he concludes American foreign policy will increasing 
become characterized by concessions, accommodations and betray 
A. Solzhenitsyn, A World Split Apart (New York 
Harper and Row Publishers, 1978), p. 11. 
Ibid . , p. 45. 
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A Window of Opportunity 
Reinforcing the Kremlin's perception of its greater 
national strength is an emerging confidence in the supremacy 
of their military forces. It is estimated that in or about 
19 1982, the Soviets will have a first strike capability. The 
Soviets will be able to destroy most of the land-based missiles, 
missile submarines and nuclear bombers of the United States in 
a surprise attack. The surviving components of the U.S. triad, 
while capable of a counter-attack, will not have the accuracy 
20 
or time span to destroy the unused missiles of the Russians. 
Therefore, a scenario can be envisaged where given temperate 
weather conditions the President could be faced with fatalities 
2 1 
as low as five million American deaths. His options will be 
to surrender, or launch his remaining nuclear weapons, killing 
22 
several dozen million Russians, and bringing the rest of the 
Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal down on the cities of the United 
States, killing up to half the population of the U.S. 
If this is so, the Soviets can then reasonably expect 
the U.S. not to provoke a crisis situation (during this 
period of Soviet nuclear superiority) which might lead to 
a nuclear exchange. It is also rational to expect a U.S. 
president to surrender if the USSR were to launch an attack 
19 
Brent Scowcroft, "A Military Report," Atlantic 
Community Quarterly, Winter 79-80, p. 411. 
20 
Paul H. Nitze, SALT II, The Objectives Vs the 
Re sults (Washington: The Committee on the Present Danger, 
Undated), p. 3. 
21 
Ibid . , p. 3. 22 Ibid., p. 3 
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solely on American strategic forces. Paul Nitze, who helped 
negotiate the first Strategic Arms Limitations Talks agree-
ment with the Soviets warns: 
We do not have to assume that the Soviet 
Union will actually attack U.S. strategic 
forces-. The point is that they will have 
the capacity to increase their advantage 
with a counterforce first strike. After 
such a first strike, the U.S. would still 
have a capability for a second strike 
retaliation against Soviet economic and 
political targets - in plain words, against 
their "hostage" cities and industrial centers. 
If Soviet civil defense failed, we could do 
"unacceptable damage" to them, but their 
forces held in reserve would still be greater 
than ours, and we have no effective civil 
(or air) defense. Their third-strike 
potential would make our second strike less 
credible. It would leave the U.S. with a 
dangerously inadequate deterrent.23 
A president could order significant damage to parts of the 
USSR but he would do so with the knowledge (because the Soviets 
had taken out his land-based missiles) that the Soviets could 
hit back much harder, therefore he should surrender. 
Soviet strategic preponderance will allow them to 
make a first strike five years before the MX would give the 
U.S. similar power. Thus, Moscow has reason to believe that 
it has a "window of opportunity" extending until the United 
States restores the balance of power. During this period they 
will have a strategic opening to pressure the West at geo-
politically sensitive spots like the Persian Gulf. The tables 
23 
Committee on the Present Danger, Is America Becoming 
Number 2? : Current Trends' in U.S.-Soviet Military Balance, 
released on Oct. 5, 1978. 
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have been turned—in 1962 Krushchev backed down in the Cuban 
missile crisis when faced with U.S. strategic superiority. 
Richard Pipes argues that the Soviets have never 
accepted the U.S. strategic doctrine in which nuclear weapons 
exist to deter the use of the other side's arsenal. Pipes 
notes that Soviet theoretical writings and actual develop-
ments of nuclear weapons indicates that the Kremlin sees 
these weapons as having more than deterrent value. He states: 
There exists a high degree of probability 
that in the event of general war the Soviet 
Union intends to use a part of its strategic 
arsenal in a devastating preemptive strike 
which would make an American retaliatory 
strike suicidal and possibly inhibit it 
altogether. The stress on large throw-
weight, combined with high accuracies of its 
I.C.B.M.s is a good indication that the 
Soviet Union intends to develop a first-strike 
capability.24 
The Soviet civil defense program which the leadership 
25 has held to be a priority, has given them a unilateral 
advantage over the U.S. and greatly strengthens the position 
of the Soviets. The emphasis and effectiveness of the Soviet 
civil defense program tends to destabilize the deterrent 
value of U.S. nuclear weapons. Paul Nitze warns: 
The U.S. can then no longer hold as sig-
nificant a proportion of the Soviet 
population as a hostage to deter a Soviet 
attack. Concurrently, Soviet industrial 
vulnerability has been reduced by deliberate 
policies, apparently adopted largely for 
military reaons ... In sum, the ability 
of U.S. nuclear power to destroy without 
0 / 
R. Pipes, "Soviet Global Strategy," Commentary, 
April '80, p. 35. 
25 Whether fear of the U.S. or China, is immaterial 
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question the bulk of Soviet industry and 
a large proportion of the Soviet population 
is by no means as clear as it once was, even 
if one assumes most of U.S. striking power 
to be available and directed to this end. 6 
What experts like Eugene Rostow, Richard Pipes, and 
Paul Nitze, hope to convince the Carter administration is that 
the Soviets will achieve shortly a "warfighting/warwinning 
27 
ability" in a nuclear war. This ability "requires the 
ability to both destroy the enemy's t i.e. the U.S.J means of 
2 8 
waging war and to defend oneself from attack. 
The Soviet first strike capability rests on its large 
missiles and its civil defense preparations. The U.S. has 
given civil defense little emphasis and has nothing comparable 
to the heavy megatonnage missiles of the Soviets. The Soviets 
then are not following a doctrine of mutual deterrence and 
nuclear stalemate, but rather realize that clear nuclear superior 
is the ultimate weapon of coercive diplomacy. We might well 
soon have an answer to Kissinger's often quoted statement: 
"What in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the 
significance of it, politically, militarily, operationally, at 
29 these levels of numbers? What do you do with it." The 
answer is of course the ability to checkmate your opponent 
"without having to fight either a nuclear or a conventional war." 
26 
27, 
Paul H. Nitze, SALT II, The Objectives , op. cit. 
Daniele Goure and Gordon H. McCormick, "Soviet Strategic 
Defense: The Neglected Dimension of the U.S.-Soviet Balance," 
Orbis, Spring '80, p. 105. 
28Ibid., p. 105. 
29 Department of State Bulletin (July 29, 1974), p. 215 
30 
E. Rostow, "The Case Against SALT II," Commentary 
Feb. '79, p. 30. 
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The U.S. has also made a fundamental mistake regarding 
"parity" between the superpowers; namely that "parity" once 
achieved will preclude the use of force by either against 
the other, as Thomas Larson points out: 
... it should be noted that the most even 
balance of military capabilities cannot 
possibly rule out the persistence of 
significant disparities in the amount and 
kinds of military power that can be applied 
in various local situations.ox 
The Soviet strategic arms build-up has been matched by its 
conventional arms build-up in tanks, in naval forces, and 
in troop transport planes able to deploy its ground troops 
32 far afield. The Americans, by allowing the Soviets in most 
areas of conventional weapons to gain superiority, have given 
the Kremlin the option of acting militarily in opposition to 
vital U.S. interests... tThisl opens vast doubts about the 
security of the NATO alliance, whose very foundation is the 
33 
American nuclear guarantee." The U.S. has relied upon the 
implicit threat to use strategic nuclear weapons in support 
of theater forces, but this threat has lost some of its 
credibility. However if there is doubt where Western Europe 
and Japan are concerned, this threat has little credibility in 
31 
Thomas B. Larson, Soviet American Rivalry (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Co. Inc., 1978), p. 216. 
32 
"Since 1970, the Soviets have added about 130,000 to 
their Warsaw Pact forces. There has been a 40% increase in 
Soviet tanks, and tank divisions have increased by up to 100% 
in some categories, and over 4,000 armored personnel carriers 
were added during 1978 alone. It should be noted ... Soviet forces 
deployed against the People's Republic of China have been increased 
and improved even more remarkably... The Soviets have given equal 
attention to their naval capability." Brent Scowcroft, "A 
Military Report," op. cit., p. 412. 
33 
E.N. Luttwak, "After Afghanistan ....," op. cit., p. 46. 
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areas of less significance since: 
Theorists whose concept of deterrence is 
limited to massive retaliation after 
a Soviet attack would have nothing of 
interest to say to a president facing 
conventional defeat in the Persian Gulf 
or in Western Europe.34 
The prospect of defeating American interests over 
much of the globe may become irresistable for the Soviets 
Moscow, viewing its "window of opportunity", might "well 
anticipate the ability to wage World War III successfully, 
Military leaders inside the Kremlin may convince the political 
leadership that military victory is possible, and at a rela-
tively low cost. Luttwak argues that the Soviets may well 
prefer to accomplish through force of arms, what they might 
feel is impossible without: namely, the reduction of internal 
difficulties. Thus he warns: 
If, by war, the Soviet Union could achieve 
a permanent enhancement of its position in 
some decisive map-changing way, all would 
become easier in the future, even the 
possibility of reduced military expenditures 
being imaginable. Alternatively, successful 
warfare might seize valuable resources for the 
Soviet state, and then the advantage of such 
resources might serve to modify the future that 
now looms so unfavourable.36 
Western "hawks" worry that the combination of emerging critical 
problems, military preponderance, and historical track record, 
will lead the Kremlin to not pass up its opportunity of perhaps 
34 
C.S. Gray and K. Payne, "Victory is Possible," 
Foreign Policy #39, Summer of '80, p. 15. 
35 
36 
Ibid. , p. 22. 
Luttwak, "After Afghanistan, What?," op. cit., p. 46 
securing the empire. 
The continual emphasis on building armed forces which 
may be able to challenge any combination of possible opponents, 
while Soviet envoys have talked about peace and disarmament 
has given the Soviets a unilateral advantage over the U.S., 
West Europe, Japan, and China. It is interesting to recall 
the warning of Sun Tzu, the fourth century B.C. strategist: 
When the enemy's envoys speak in humble 
terms, but he continues his preparations, 
he will advance.3' 
37 
Sun Tzu, The Art of War (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1913), p. 119. 
Chapter III: Internal Exigencies 
The Legitimacy Crisis 
When the existence of the Church is 
threatened, she is released from the 
commandments of morality. With unity 
as the end, the use of every means is 
sanctified, even cunning, treachery, 
violence, simony, prison, death. 
For all order is for the sake of the 
community, and the individual must 
be sacrificed to the common good. 
Dietrich Von Nieheim 
Bishop of Verden: 
De schismate libri 
III A.D. 1411. 
From an operational viewpoint the Marxist-Leninist 
ideology preserved and strengthened the traditions of Russian 
society and provided an expansionist power's creed which 
afforded protection to the Soviet state. From its inception, 
the ideology was well-suited to the totalitarian form of 
government since it is a future-oriented doctrine which takes 
pressure off the legitimacy functions of any present govern-
men t. 
The early faith in the imminent transformation of man 
and the state has disappeared; but the structure of power 
created in those hopeful early days remains, and has lately 
grown increasingly repressive and self-serving. A great many 
nominal communists in the Soviet Union no longer give more 
than lip-service to their ideology because their leaders no 
longer act as if they believed in it. The ideology has not 
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produced what it was expected to produce. After Stalin and 
the diluted Stalinism of Brezhnev, the Soviet Union has ceased 
to be a model that many nations would want to imitate. 
The system has outlived the hopes that gave birth to 
it. Indeed, it has grown more rigid as the ideology has 
faded because it can no longer call on a widespread belief 
in the ideology to justify its own existence. The KGB, and 
its cousins, deal with the dissidents; the debate about needed 
changes remains muffled. Today, the central role of the 
ideology is its use as a means of internal political and social 
control. The egalitarian spirit of Marxism has been lost in 
bureaucratic elitism. 
The loss of conviction in the ideology is tantamount 
to Christianity losing faith in heaven. The Communist Party 
needs to instill a conviction that Utopia is ahead because it 
is the basis for a legitimacy that would evaporate in the 
absence of popular will. Building a socialist paradise can 
excuse the Soviet elite from charges of self-seeking and greed 
for power and privilege. 
An important consequence strategically involved in the 
loss of legitimacy is the "Soviet imperial position in Eastern 
Europe and the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty 
which safeguards it ideologically." Soviet hegemony over 
the so-called "fraternal" countries rests on the Red Army, 
S. Bialer, "The Soviet Political Elite and Internal 
Developments in the U.S.S.R.," in The Soviet Empire: Expansion 
and Detente, edited by W.E. Griffith (Toronto: Lexington Books, 
1976), p. 47. 
but the basis for the use of force is the legitimacy of the 
CPSU as the sole repository of the "truth". 
The Soviet Union faces serious difficulties such as: 
shortages of goods, particularly food; labour surpluses and 
labour shortages in some areas; deteriorating workplace dis 
cipline; alcoholism; pay scale inequalities, shortages of 
energy and raw materials, and many other increasing diffi-
culties. The prescription would be liberalizing the author 
tarian nature of the regime to increase productivity and 
overcome bureaucratic bottlenecks. 
The basic necessity for economic reform -
including in part, the establishment of 
greater economic independence for state 
enterprises, decentralization of planning 
and the introduction of elements of a 
mixed economy - appears incontrovertible. 
However any such reforms, inevitably 
affecting the very tases of the totalitarian 
economic and social structure, are very un-
likely at the present time.2 
The Communist Party cannot allow a liberalization 
process to occur since greater freedom of expression for al 
Soviet citizens might allow the germination of secessionist 
movements which ultimately could split the USSR asunder. * 
Suppose a free political debate were to break out and ramif 
on such matters as the devolution of decision-making from 
Moscow, the decollectivisation (partial or total) of agri-
culture, the toleration of religious beliefs and observance 
the burden of defense expenditures, and other areas of dis-
The Guardian, March 16, 1980, Sakharov, from Exile, 
Relates his hopes and fears, p. 15. 
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agreement. Soon there could be strong polarization of attitudes 
along ethnic lines, with most of the national groups taking the 
more liberal line most of the time. 
What is more, some of the most restive minorities would 
be ones concentrated in sizeable and well-defined territories; 
they would be well-placed' to secede (which the Soviet Con-
stitution formally allows them to do) were the situation to 
become ripe. In the meantime they may increasingly orchestrate 
their several protests, the Central Asiatic Republics and 
the Ukraine being a natural dais for this purpose. Therefore 
while the Kremlin cannot afford to liberalize, it faces 
increasing its problems by not doing so. 
The autocratic system of government in which electors 
mobilize support for the regime's policy and don't legitimize 
its rule imposes a strange pattern of demands on Soviet 
foreign policy. It has been theorized that due to the 
"insecurities of dictatorial power" the party has a vested 
interest in maintaining an atmosphere of tension internationally, 
The Politburo is seen to need a climate of permanent emergency 
to justify its monopoly of power. Amalrik observes: 
A regime [withl such an ideology needs 
internal enemies who are not so much 
'class' enemies as national enemies 
(for instance, Chinese and Jews). Such 
a nationalistic ideology, although it 
may prove termporarily useful to the 
regime, is very dangerous for a country 
in which those of the Russian nationality con-
stitute less than half the total population.^ 
M. Schwartz, The Foreign Policy of the U.S.S.R.: 
Domestic Factors (Riverside: Dickenson Pub. Co., 1975), p. 138 
4 
A. Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?, 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 38. 
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How serious is this identification crisis of the 
Communist Party? Amalrik, the Russian historian, has drawn 
some interesting historical parallels between ]917 and the 
present: 
A cast-ridden and immobile society, a rigid 
governmental system which openly clashes with 
the need for economic development, general 
bureaucratization and the existence of a 
privileged bureaucratic class, and national 
animosities within a multinational state in 
which certain nations enjoy privileged status. 
Richard Pipes of Harvard argues that the only mandate 
the Bolshevik regime does have, is derived from history 
(the claim that it represents the vanguard of the majestic 
force of progress whose mission it is to accomplish the final 
social revolution in human history). Thus, the regime cannot 
accept the status quo of the international system as permanent 
since this would be giving up the historical mandate to further 
6 the revolutxon. 
- the question of legitimacy would at once 
crop up. For indeed, who has given the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union the 
right to monopolise the country's political 
authority as well as its human and material 
resources.' 
The legitimacy problem can only be attenuated by an 
active self-seeking foreign policy behaviour on the part of 
the Soviet elite. This stance is compatible with the political 
self-interest of the ruling elite, and the historical drive 
of Russian expansion. 
A. Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive ...., 
op. cit., p. 43.. 
Richard Pipes, "Soviet Global Strategy," in Commentary 
April 1980, p. 32. 
Ibid., p. 3 2. 
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Thus ideology, political survival and 
economic exigencies reinforce one another 
impelling Russia toward conquest. Each 
new territory acquired becomes part of the 
national "patrimony" and is, sooner or 
later, incorporated into the homeland. 
Each demands a "buffer" to protect it from 
real or imaginary enemies, until it, too, 
becomes part of the homeland, and in turn, 
requires its own buffer.8 
The vindication of the Soviet state becomes expansion 
of its power, which serves as a deception for the failure of 
the realization of Bolshevik social programs. Emphasis is 
placed by party ideologies on the importance of building 
Communism in the USSR on and influencing the course of the entire 
development of the world. 
The legitimacy problem has overtones which account for 
much of the seriousness of both the nationalities and 
economy problems. We shall therefore not end our discussion 
of this problem here but rather pick it up again where 
applicable in the next two problem areas to be examined. In 
the final section we will discuss how this problem will 
influence trends in the foreign policy of the USSR. 
The Nationalities Problem 
A minority is discontented not because 
there is no national union but because 
it does not enjoy the right to use its 
native language and the discontent 
will pass of itself ... give it its 
own schools and all grounds for 
discontent will disappear. 
Stalin9 
R. Pipes, "Soviet Global Strategy," op. cit., p. 32. 
9 Quoted in R. Conquest, Soviet Nationalities Policy in 
Practice (New York: Praeger Pub., 1967), p. 8. 
45 
Many ethnic groups have acquired a persistent grudge 
against the Soviet regime which, despite Lenin's efforts,has 
taken over the Tsarist legacy. Things were made worse still 
in some areas by the Nazi occupation. Either because they were 
anti-Soviet, or for purely nationalistic motives, large parts 
of the Ukraine collaborated with the invaders. The warmth 
with which the German troops were received came as a severe 
blow to the Russians: it proved that ethnic minorities could 
become a fifth column. There is the same distrust of the 
three Baltic republics, the last to be incorporated in the 
Soviet Union where the resistance to Russian influence is 
increasingly taking the form of an upsurge in religion. 
The situation is complicated even more because of the 
jealousy between some ethnic minorities and the Russian 
community. For historical and cultural reasons groups 
like the Baits, the Georgians, and the Armenians have a higher 
standard of living than the Russians. They are entitled to 
exemptions that Moscow refuses Russians. Caucasian peasants, 
for example, are allowed to get rich supplying the 'Kolkhoz' 
markets in Moscow and Leningrad. 
The focus of the nationality problem for Moscow is now 
centred in Central Asia, where the nationalities problem is 
one of demographics: 
... a marked dichotomy has existed over 
about the last two decades between the 
nationalities of the Eastern USSR, which 
are characterized by low rates of 
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growth, and the nationalities of the 
Caucasus and Central Asia, which have ~ 
evinced high rates of population increase. 
The birthrate is declining in European Russia, contributing 
to an acute labour shortage. But in Soviet Central Asia, 
the birthrate of non-Russians is rising. Ethnic tensions and 
economic dislocation are likely to result. It is not likely 
that Soviet Asians will migrate to European Russia voluntarily. 
This traditional "stay at home" attitude 
makes it unlikely that the accumulating 
Moslem surplus will voluntarily disperse 
through emigration to other parts of the 
Soviet Union. If they do not emigrate 
demographic pressures within the region 
cannot but inflame the ethnic conflict, 
given the fact that the Moslems are 
largely rural, the non-Moslem immigrants 
urban.H 
Unless Soviet leaders build up non-Russian areas, the industrial 
economy will run out of workers. If they do invest,the new 
Central Asian elite which has emerged will be better placed 
to challenge the ethnic Russians for political control. The 
Russians are well aware that the Central Asian republics 
"have the economic and institutional base, the infrastructure 
and the political elites to assume an independent statehood. 
Thus the Soviet republics are essentially more viable as 
independent states than some of the Asian and African 
Ralph S. Clem, "Recent Demographic Trends Among Soviet 
Nationalities and Their Implications," in Nationalism in the 
U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe: in the era of Brezhnev and Kosygin 
edited by George W. Simmonds (Detroit: Univ. of Detroit Press, 
1977) , p. 37 . 
Theresa Harmstone, "Nationalism in Soviet Cental As.ia 
Since 1964," in Nationalism in the U.S.S.R. edited by Simmonds, 
op. cit., p. 27. 
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count ries . ,,12 Further, 
... the cultural nationalism is already there 
and its political impact gains momentum with 
the entry into the political arena of in-
creasingly aggressive and rapidly growing 
national communist elites. Social and economic 
pressures are building up fast spurred by the 
demographic explosion. These will accelerate 
as Moslem youth overcomes the traditional 
inertia and starts moving through the system 
of technical training that begins to open up 
- into urban and industrial centers and 
into direct competition with immigrants. 
The movement has already begun.13 
The imperialist nature of Russian domination is 
personified by their concentration in urban areas; they domi-
nate the capital cities. "By way of contrast only one in every 
14 four to six Moslems is urbanized." The use of the Russian 
language "is the primary vehicle of Soviet national integration 
... [however] in Central Asia almost three fourths of the 
native peoples are unfamiliar with the language. In practical 
terms this means that their social and political mobility, 
even in their own ethnic areas, is severely restricted." Most 
analysts feel that the Soviet effort to "Russify" the non-
Russian nationalities has failed; "the rate of their national 
self-assertion exceeds the rate of their assimilation into 
i «. .,16 
a common value system. 
12 
13 
14 
Harmstone, "Nationalism in Soviet ....," op . cit., p. 27. 
Ibid., p. 277. 
Ibid . , p. 2 7 7. 
15 
Theresa Harmstone, "The Study of Ethnic Politics in 
the USSR," in Nationalism in the U.S.S.R. edited by Simmonds, 
op. cit., p. 25. 
16 lb id. , p. 32 
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The ascendance of: 
Cultural nationalism has serious political 
overtones. The newly-found national pride 
and self-respect throws into question the 
hitherto unchallenged cultural "superiority" 
of the Russians and their political role 
as well.17 
The Soviet elite are faced with defending the status 
quo by a return to an imperialist state based on Russian 
nationalism. This is where the legitimacy claim of the 
C.P.S.U. has no firm foundation. Because "Marxism-Leninism 
postulates that a class and not a nation is the basis of 
political unity, the foundation of political integration of 
a communist state is provided by 'proletarian internationalism 
18 
and not by nationalism." 
The leadership's earlier hopes that the process of 
Soviet development over time would wither ethnic nationalism 
away has not been realized. Indeed, the aggravation of ethnic 
tensions on nationality lines "threatens the most potent 
unifying and legitimizing systemic force within Soviet society 
the great power nationalism, which primarily accounts for the 
19 political stability of the Soviet state." 
The nationality problem accounts for the Soviet elite 
not being able to decentralize the economy. Because, 
The nationality problem and the danger of 
its intensification, adds another dimension 
p. 286 
17 
18 
Harmstone, "Nationalism in Soviet Asia ....," op. cit 
op . cit. , p. 3 2 
19 
p. 44. 
Harmstone, "The Study of Ethnic Politics 
2. 
S. Bialer, "The Soviet Political Elite . , op. cit . 
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to, and greatly complicates, many of the 
administrative and political dilemmas which 
the Party faces. Most important in this 
respect is the superimposition of the ethnic 
dimension over the Party's dilemma in the 
field of economic organization. There the need 
for greater economic effectiveness generates 
pressure for decentralization, which in turn, 
however, clashes with the Party's fear that 
it will lead to loss of political control.20 
The nationality problem and the fear it generates in 
Russians, reinforces the traditional internal authoritarianism 
and centralization of decision making. Where once the enemy 
was outside, it is now inside the empire and a highly cent-
ralized regime is once again necessitated. This fear of non-
Russians inside the empire is the major break on the evolution 
of the Soviet system away from authoritarianism. There is 
little chance that a major change in leadership inside the 
C.P.S.U. would differ on this course. Differences can only 
be of style not substance; the Russians are prisoners of their 
culture and history. 
The Islamic Revival 
People of Moslem stock live mainly in six southern 
republics of the Soviet Union: Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Kirghizia, which make up Soviet Central Asia, 
plus the vast steppeland of Kazakhstan and the republic of 
Azerbaijan. Tartar Moslems also live around Kazan in Central 
Russia. The Tartars are descended from the Mongol hordes and 
the Uzbeks from the heirs of Tamurlane. 
p. 44. 
20 
S. Bialer, "The Soviet Political Elite ....," op. cit., 
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Central Asia was the last area to be conquered by 
Tsarist Russia, with the final frontiers of empire established 
only 100 years ago. Thus, Moscow's grip on its Moslem commu-
nities could be threatened by the interest the new leaders of 
Iran are showing in their Moslem brothers across their nation's 
northern border. There are 40 million Moslems in the two 
regions of the Soviet Union that flank Iran. They not only 
share religion with their Iranian neighbours but they also 
speak Iranian and Turkic languages. 
The Soviets have gone to great lengths to make the 
colonial status of the Central Asiatic Republics less evident; 
some of these efforts have benefited the local populations. 
Yet Moscow cannot escape the anomaly that, in the contemporary 
world of sovereign nation-states, Central Asia and the Caucasus 
remain among the few sizeable areas and populations still 
ruled by aliens. Not much has been heard from these areas 
in the past century, but this is probably about to be changed. 
The Moslems are no longer isolated. Because of a much higher 
birthrate than the ethnic Europeans, the Moslem population is 
rising at a phenomenal rate—and could be 100 million by the 
end of the century. 
Khomeini has expressed concern at the fate of the 
Moslems of Central Asia. By raising the issue of Islam in the 
Soviet Union, he gives support to Moslems there and brings 
attention to their cause. Therefore if a stable Islamic 
government evolves in Iran, it could cause the Soviets a lot 
of trouble. In any analysis of the invasion of Afghanistan, 
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the defensive motive on the part of the Soviet elite, should 
not be underplayed. The Russians are well aware of their 
position as colonial masters. 
Further complicating the nationalities problem is 
the outside interference, not solely from Islamic interests 
21 but also actions on the part of the USSR's rival, the U.S. 
The Americans are using broadcasts in seven languages by 
"Voice of America" and "Radio Liberty" to exacerbate this 
Soviet problem. The Americans see the ethnic groups as 
vulnerable over time to splitting tactics or, if you wish, to 
open, friendly, peacable appeals to the ethnic's 'human rights' 
The U.S. hopes to increase the cost to the Kremlin of keeping 
them in line, and to identify the U.S. as sympathetic to their 
Islamic longings. 
Richard Pipes points out the gravity of the 
'Nationality Problem': 
... all the evidence available from within 
the Soviet Union itself and from historic 
parallels with other countries indicates 
that nationalism of the minority peoples 
of the USSR (like that of the Russians 
themselves) has grown and intensified since 
1917. There is a great deal of nationalist 
frustration in the Soviet Union. Unless 
the Soviet rulers face up to it and begin the 
process of decentralization voluntarily, it 
is likely someday to explode in a most 
destructive manner.22 
21 
The Guardian, Brzezinski Aims to Reach Soviet Moslems, 
Jan. 20, 1980. 
22 
Richard Pipes, "Solving the Nationality Problem" in 
Man, State and Society in the Soviet Union (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1973), p. 513. 
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The Soviet elite faces a problem that can only increase 
as the unrealized expectations in the economic and political 
sectors present the non-Russians with the evidence that the 
Russians have no intention to move from the status quo. 
Increasingly, the Russians will be forced to fall back on a 
'Great Power' posture to provide a legitimizing basis for 
Russian political control of the empire. This posture will 
necessarily call for aggressive, belligerent directions in 
Soviet foreign policy. 
The Economic Problem 
It is as if the Soviet leaders and the 
people have entered into an unwritten 
contract by which the former guarantee 
a minimum revenue for a modicum of 
work in return for the latter's 
undertaking not to interfere 
in politics. 
23 Amalric 
After several decades of diminishingly rapid growth, 
Soviet industry is now running into serious difficulty. Rising 
raw material costs, impending energy shortages, slower growth 
in the supply of labour and capital and sluggish productivity 
are all pointers to a limping industry in the 1980s. In 1979 
the Soviet Union realized its lowest peacetime growth rate 
s ince the 19 30s. 
The combination of sluggish industrial growth 
with a bad harvest, near-stagnant livestock 
production, and transport and construction 
23 
Jacques Amalric, "The Soviet Union at 60," Atlas 
World Press Review, Feb. '78, p. 20. 
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bottlenecks, resulted in an increment of only 
1.9 percent in the USSR's official measure 
of 'national income utilized'. Western-
style GNP measures would almost certainly 
yield a lower figure.24 
In the 1980s the Soviet Union faces a major problem in 
trying to meet the pervasive need for change. Its system is 
simply too rigid for modern economic conditions. In the 
past growth has been based partially on increased labour 
productivity. This has tailed off and increased incentives 
and looser controls might increase productivity, but for ideo-
logical reasons, they are unlikely to be adopted. Until 
recently the Russians had enough men and resources to achieve 
planned growth, however wastefully. They are in no position 
to do this anymore as labour in industrial areas is becoming 
scarce. Given the demands of a modern economy the Soviets 
need to decentralize the command structure of the economy but 
for reasons of protecting the legitimacy of the C.P.S.U. this 
u • -ui 25 
becomes impossible. 
Proposed solutions to economic problems—a return to 
Stalin's model of forced growth, or a massive flow of capital 
and technology from the West--would have dramatic political 
consequences. So the Soviet Union's do-nothing policy persists 
The probable result will be a decline in Soviet political 
power and inevitably, difficulties at home or with its 
satellites as goods become more scarce. Soviet military power 
'Quarterly Economic Review of the U.S.S.R." produced 
by The Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd. (London: Spencer 
House, 1980), p. 11. 
25 
As discussed previously, the hegemony over the non-
Russian nationalities could be shattered if a process of libera 
zation were to gain momentum. 
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and a return to a strict police state will be necessary to 
protect the legitimacy of the C.P.S.U. as the decision-making 
organ of the ruling elite. 
An ever-increasing burden on the Soviet economy is the 
defense industry, it exacts a heavy share of the total resources 
of the economy. Armaments produced in the USSR represent 
one-third of all machine products, one-fifth of all metallurgical 
products, and one_sixth of all chemical products. They consume 
7 f\ 
one-sixth of all energy resources. There is little chance 
however that the Soviet elite will cut back its armaments 
production. According to Mr. Donald Green, an American analyst, 
even if Soviet defense expenditures were frozen at 4 percent a 
year, the extra growth from the arms freeze would be only 0.1 
27 percent a year. So why bother? 
The most important factor, stopping the Soviet elite from 
cutting back its armaments expenditure, is that it would weaken 
the Soviet Union's principal claim to being a superpower. It 
is clear that the Soviet Union in the 1980s will not be able 
to compete as a world economic power with the U.S., the Common 
Market, or Japan. 
The agriculture sector of the economy is in continually 
bad shape. The Kremlin has been pumping investment into 
agriculture (at a rate of 340 billion rouble or 500 billion 
2 8 dollars in the last 15 years) yet it still has to import 
9 f\ 
Atlas World Press Review, Feb. 1979. 
2 7 
The Economist, Russia into the 1980s, Dec. 29/79. 
Ibid . 
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grain. The collective farms are an economic disaster. Much 
of the nation's farmland lies too far north to be very pro-
ductive, and large grain crops depend on unusually good 
weather. As in industry, Soviet farms would also benefit from 
flexible planning and individual initiative. 
The private household plots run by over 
40 million families in the USSR still 
provide around a quarter of the nation's 
food supply, despite severe restrictions 
on their size and operation.29 
Certainly the most critical problem facing the Soviet 
economy is an energy shortage. The CIA presented to Congress 
some alarming forecasts. The CIA predicts that production 
will peak this year or next at about 12 million barrels a day-
30 
and that it could drop by one-third by the mid-'80s. 
Quoting from the CIA report: 
Optimistically assuming domestic oil production 
of 10 million barrels a day in '85, net oil 
imports from the west would reach more than 
3 million barrels a day if domestic require-
ments were fully met and exports to Communist 
countries were maintained at projected 1980 
levels of 1.9 million barrels a day. These 
imports would cost the Soviets more than $20 
billion at June '79 oil prices and would 
imply a shift in the trade balance of some 
$25 billion in current prices, almost twice 
Moscow's present earnings on commodity trade 
with the West .... Oil imports of this 
magnitude would obviously exhaust Soviet 
hard currency resources.31 
The Russian economy needs to find within four years at 
least two million barrels per day just to match 1980 levels. 
29 
"Quarterly Economic Review of the ....," op. cit., p 
30 
H.E. Meyer, "Why We Should Worry About The Soviet 
Energy Crunch," in Fortune, Feb. 25, 1980. 
Ibid . 
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This would be a very hard task for a rich nation of the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development; for the 
Russians who lack hard currency it is probably impossible. 
The Western nations are scrambling to assure increased supplies; 
this further reduced Soviet chances of obtaining needed energy 
supplies. 
The Soviet oil industry is technologically very back-
ward. According to Arthur A. Meyerhoff, a Tulsa-based con-
sultant who specializes in Soviet oil production, the Russians 
are nearly thirty years behind their American counterparts. 
Soviet crews need an entire year to drill wells to a depth of 
10,000 feet—a job that American crews complete on average in 
32 thirty-four days. 
There seems little chance that the Soviets will be 
able to maintain their present oil production. It is estimated 
that oil production will peak this year or next and then 
decline. 
Soviet supply problems are compounded by problems of 
logistics; ninety percent of future on-shore supplies lie 
east of the Ural Mountains in the remote wastes of Siberia 
and the deserts of Kazakhstan. Yet 80 percent of all Soviet 
energy is consumed thousands of miles away in the western part 
of the country. Older Soviet oil fields on the Caspian Sea 
are near exhaustion, and the most promising newer fields in 
Western Siberia have already peaked. The Soviets must tap 
32 H.E. Meyer, "Why We Should Worry ....," op. cit 
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known reserves in more remote areas of Siberia. That will 
be costly and unpopular with the long-suffering neglected 
consumer since resources in increasing amounts will be poured 
into finding fuel and power at the expense of the housing 
and consumer goods sector'. 
Russia has vast potential oil reserves in the Arctic, 
in Western Siberia, and off-shore, but the exploration of 
these is at least a decade away. Most of the oil for the 
1980s will have to come from existing fields and from new fields 
in areas already under production. 
Implications of the Energy Crisis 
Serious oil production problems would probably force 
the Soviet Union to cut exports of its Eastern-bloc allies, 
which now depend on the USSR for two million barrels per day. 
That would compel the Eastern bloc to turn to the world market, 
generating new competition for OPEC supplies. If by the mid-'80s 
the Soviet Union does find itself obliged to import oil from 
OPEC nations to keep its COMECON allies supplied--as the CIA 
predicts--it will face a huge import bill. Even if the Soviet 
Union charged the East Europeans a good deal more for their 
oil, and boosted its gas and machinery exports to the West, 
it would still be landed with a large trade gap. Oil may face 
Soviet leaders with a choice between economic and political 
stability in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union's continued 
ability to import Western grain and technology. 
Therefore the energy crisis will have other far-reaching 
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implications. Reduced Soviet oil exports to Eastern Europe 
may result in political instability there. A cutback in oi] 
sales to the West will deprive the USSR of the hard currency 
it desperately needs to pay for sophisticated Western 
technology. 
Most Western analysts are convinced that the Soviet 
Union simply cannot afford to cut back the one million barrels 
a day it now exports to the West; much of the nation's hard 
currency comes from such sales. Rather than lose that cash, 
which is badly needed for the purchase of food and technology, 
the Soviet government will probably decide to shortchange energy 
consumers at home. This will lead to further domestic unrest 
on the part of the long-suffering Soviet consumer. 
"Hawks" in the West draw ominous conclusions from the 
Soviet short term energy crisis. They see the problems of 
access and supply as urgent if the Soviet Union [Russian Empire] 
is to remain stable. Thus, they see Moscow strategists as 
planning to counterbalance falling domestic oil production 
with cheap access to foreign oil. The Persian Gulf is seen 
as the Kremlin's target, the supply route for 30% of America's 
33 
oil, 65% of Western Europe's, and over 70% of Japan's. 
Undoubtedly the Kremlin is well aware of its future oil 
shortage, and also of the declining production-to-reserves 
ratio in comparison to its rival, the United States. The U.S. 
has nearby Mexico and Venezuela, a majority of OPEC states more 
33 
Walter J. Levy, "Oil and the Decline of the West," 
Foreign Affairs, .Winter '79, p. 109. 
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or less united against communism, and the probability of a 
breakthrough on tar-sands as the price rises. This all gives 
the U.S. an edge over a USSR shortage of both hard currency 
and the high level technology needed to develop new Siberian 
oil fields locked under the ice thousands of miles from the 
34 USSR's big cities. 
Hard-liners feel sure that the Soviets must then have 
a plan to move into the Gulf, while the opportunity presents 
itself. 
Unwilling to run the risks of muddling 
through with less oil, unable to buy more 
oil in the open market the Russians may 
have no choice but to go for the third 
option - to try to take whatever oil they 
will need without paying for it.35 
Can the West stop the Soviets? The Kremlin may well feel 
it has such a preponderance of conventional and nuclear arms 
during its "window of opportunity"--1982-1986--that it can 
afford to take extreme measures to safeguard its perceived 
interests. "One benefit of being number one is that you need 
not stand by helplessly while your economy grinds to a halt 
and your empire disintegrates." 
Publicists and experts like Richard Nixon and Edward 
Luttwak view Soviet moves in Ethiopia, South Yemen, and now 
Afghanistan, as preparing groundwork for an advance on the 
oil fields of the Middle East. 
34 
backfire. 
35 
36 
Carter's ban on the export of high technology could 
H.E. Meyer, "Why We Should Worry op. cit. 
Ibid. 
Chapter IV China: The External Threat 
You can see in the murky twilight 
The new Mongol warriors with bombs in their quivers 
But if they attack the alarm bells will ring 
And there will be more than enough fighters 
For a new battle of Kuilkovo. 
Yevtushenko, 
On the Red Snow of the Ussuri 
The Russian thinks and sees China through the prism of 
Russian culture and history. Russian history is filled with a 
thousand years of fighting and war with yellow-skinned warriors. 
He may confuse Mongol with Chinese, but the emotional attitudes 
fixed in his childhood and reinforced through his adult life 
have conditioned him to fear the "yellow peril." The passage 
quoted above from Yevtushenko's chauvinistic poem indicates to 
the Russian mind the Chinese are the new Mongols, at whose 
hands the Russians suffered for more than three centuries. 
They may be Uzbek, they may be Mongol, or they 
may be the Han people of China. To the 
Russian they are all the same. He does not 
distinguish between the Mongols who ravaged 
his land 600 years ago and the masses of 
China whom he believes are standing just 
beyond the low hills of Asia ready to attack 
again, silent, secretly, without warning.1 
How real is this perceived threat to the Soviet Union? 
Well, in the long run Moscow's power is probably slipping 
away. When, in a couple of decades, the USSR is faced with a 
China of comparable military and industrial power sitting on 
Harrison Salisbury, War Between Russia and China 
(New York: Bantam Books, 1970), p. 18. 
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its southern frontier, its ability to exert pressure on any-
body else in the world will be all but non-existent. The 
Soviet Union has an abysmally unproductive agriculture, a 
lot of aging, very inefficient heavy industry, and only a 
few highly privileged and coddled sectors like defense and 
space research that can compete with the rest of the world. 
China, on the other hand, is the mother of all the East Asian 
cultures. The others—Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, have 
realized outstanding growth rates, and are collectively the 
economic success story of the world. A China that can realize 
20 years of economic growth approaching the rate of these 
countries will enable the Chinese to develop armed forces 
2 
comparable to those of the Soviet Union or in fact, greater. 
Will the Chinese, once they have strengthened their 
armed forces, utilize these forces against the Soviets? The 
answer could be "yes". Demographic statistics indicate the 
Chinese population will number close to two billion, early 
in the next century. The Chinese could very well be con-
fronted with the dilemma of starve or fight. The Chinese have 
been having a good deal of success with their agricultural 
effort, but given the vagaries of climate, a couple of bad 
crops could bring on a crisis situation. The Chinese then 
would really have no alternative, particularly not when food 
and food-producing areas lie on their perimeter and when thousands 
of square miles of those areas once were theirs by right of 
2 In terms of available military resources which can be 
brought to bear in a situation; presumably the Kremlin would 
not strip all of its forces from the West to send to the East. 
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tribute and subjection. Therefore, on the basis of dire 
economic circumstances the Chinese could be compeled to expand 
at the expense of the Soviet Union. 
For China to regain its past dominant role in Asia, 
she must take back certain lands from the USSR. Formerly, 
the large, lightly populated territories of Siberia and the 
Soviet maritime provinces were once part of China's sphere of 
influence. Now, of course, these territories have been in-
corporated into the Soviet Union, the incorporation of which • 
has made that state China's main rival for the position of 
dominant actor in Asia. 
It is essential for China somehow to elimiate 
or neutralize this rival if she is to play a 
dominant role in Asia and the world at large. 
Any discussion of China's ability to expand at the 
expense of the Soviet Union is dependent on China's ability to 
modernize and achieve a growth rate similar to Japan. Is 
it realistic to expect China to match the economic growth 
rate of Japan? Yes, particularly since Japan will provide 
much of the capital and technology while China has the raw 
resources and the abundant cheap labour. In August 1978 
the Chinese and Japanese took the historic step of signing a 
peace and friendship treaty, containing a clause which 
obliquely condemned Soviet hegemony. For China,this is a 
treaty of immense significance; it creates the prerequisites 
for coordinating China's vast manpower resources and Japan's 
Andre Amalrik, Will The Soviet Union Survive Until 
1984? , op. cit. , p. 47. 
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economic potential. Both countries see this treaty as the 
basis for huge Japanese investments to modernize and in-
dustrialize China. 
... the Chinese have actually built Japan 
into their economic plan. They have taken 
a calculating look at the Japanese economy, 
at the desire of Japanese businessmen to 
trade with China, and at areas of com-
plimentarity between Chinese and Japanese 
economics, and simply regard Japan as part 
of the plan ... there are other factors of 
mutual attraction not unlike those which 
resulted in the E.E.C. The future of 
North Asia will be one in which China and , 
Japan form the nucleus of the new Asian E.C. 
There is little doubt in Soviet minds that Peking hopes 
its new relationship with Japan will develop into an anti-
Soviet military alliance with .a re-armed Japan. The Soviet 
journal International Affairs warns that Chinese leaders' 
emphasis on "common interests" with Japan is an elaborate 
strategic plan "for demarcating these countries' spheres of 
influence in Asia, isolating the USSR blocking and under-
mining its position in Southeast Asia and Pacific states." 
The journal notes that Chinese leaders are urging Japanese 
military circles "to extend the military ties between the 
two countries' armed forces, assuring Japan of their approval 
of its line for a military build-up with the U.S.A. ,thus coming 
out in support of Japanese militarism." 
S. FitzGerald, "China a Stabilizing Force?," in Atlantic 
Community Quarterly, Vol. 17 1979, p. 43. 
Y. Semyono, "Peking's Policy Constitutes A Military 
Threat," in International Affairs (Moscow) April '79, p. 71. 
Ibid. , p. 71. 
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The same Soviet journal in a different article, sees 
U.S. support for the Sino-Japanese treaty as a U.S. attempt 
to "tie Peking to the West [and! that the Treaty is in keeping 
with the present U.S. global strategy of using China and 
Japan in the interests of American policy in the Far East 
Hi.e., an anti-Soviet alliance in AsiaJ." 
The Soviets may feel that their worries of an anti-
Soviet alliance were confirmed by Deng Xiaoping's visit to 
Japan immediately after his trip to the U.S.A., and Vice-
President Mondale's stop-over in Japan on his return from 
China in August 1979. 
Certainly the Soviets take this threat seriously; 
Q 
Dr. Georg Arbatov senior advisor on foreign affairs of an 
incipient anti-Soviet alliance comprising the U.S., Japan, 
9 
the People's Republic, and NATO." He further warned "If such 
an axis is built on an anti-Soviet basis then there is no 
place for detente, even in a narrow sense." 
Chinese territorial claims worry the Soviet leadership 
for reasons which transcend simply security interests. These 
claims threaten the legitimacy of Soviet rule over lands once 
ruled by Russian Tsars. If Peking has no right to rule over 
the indigenous populations of the disputed territories merely 
C. Apalin, "Peking, The West and Detente," in 
International Affairs (Moscow), Feb. '79, p. 51. 
Q 
Interview by J. Power with Dr. Georg Arbatov in London 
Observer, Nov. 12 '78. 
9Ibid. 
10T, ., Ibid . 
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because they were once part of the Chinese empire, on what 
basis does the USSR retain lands and boundaries which 
correspond to Imperial Russia? Therefore, Chinese claims and 
Soviet responses ascerbate the legitimacy problem of the 
C.P.S.U. 
The China problem has further ramifications for the 
legitimacy problem of the C.P.S.U. As one Russian historian 
observed: 
The need for an ideological underpinning 
forces the regime to look toward a new 
ideology, namely, Great Russian nationalism, 
with its characteristic cult of strength 
and expansionist ambitions.! 
China becomes a useful means for providing a plausible 
and probable enemy for a desired end. In the long run, as 
Amalrik notes, this reliance on "Great Russian nationalism" 
is very dangerous in a state where the Russian nationality 
will constitute less than half the total population. 
If war is inevitable as both the Chinese and Soviets 
profess, is it logical to expect the Russians to wait until 
the Chinese are considerably stronger? For the present, the 
USSR enjoys significant all-around military superiority in 
the Eurasian land mass. The future is uncertain; the Soviet 
Union could be faced with encirclement by acombination of 
the United States, a re-armed Japan, a mobilized Western 
Europe, and a greatly strengthened China. For the Soviet 
Union not to act to prevent this serious threat from maturing 
A. Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive ...., 
op. cit., p. 38. 
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would be inconsistent with a remarkably consistent pattern of 
expansion by Moscow (over the last six centuries) when faced 
with a grave external threat to the empire. 
In a relatively short time-span, when China has aug-
mented its forces to preclude a nuclear attack and strengthened 
its conventional forces, the Soviets would face a long, pro-
tracted military conflict if war were to occur. It is 
probable that the Soviets would end up having to transfer 
much of their military forces to the Far East,in which event 
the USSR's ability to look after its interests in Eastern 
Europe would be greatly diminished. Amalrik speculates that: 
Germany will surely be reunited ... a re-
united Germany with a fairly pronounced 
anti-Soviet orientation will create an 
entirely new situation in Europe ... 
several countries at least, such as 
Hungary and Rumania, will promptly follow Hungary and Kumania, will prompi 
their pro-German orientation.12 
Amalrik further speculates that as the war would progress 
Russian nationalism would decline while non-Russian nationalism 
13 
would rise. Eventually a moral weariness with a war waged 
far away and for no apparent reason, and increasing discontent 
about the economy, would lead to strong dissatisfaction with 
the regime on the part of the middle class. In short, the 
regime could face a revolution similar to thatof 1917 in its 
roots. 
Clearly, the Soviet elite has good reason to be con-
cerned, and might feel that the China problem must be taken 
12 
A. Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive 
op. cit., p. 60. 
13 Ibid., p. 62 
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care of while the Soviet Union has a military preponderance 
vis a vis China and any alliances China may forge. The Soviet 
leadership must not allow the USSR to become embroiled in a 
war with China at a time of its choice. 
In the mid-seventies, events occurring along the arc 
extending from the Horn of Africa to Southeast Asia served 
to convince the Chinese leadership that the U.S. lacked the 
national will to check Soviet moves directed toward effecting 
a change in the global balance of power. Groups in both China 
and America concurring with this assessment worked towards 
effecting normalization of relations with the desired end 
of restraining Moscow. "Each thought the other would add 
14 
strength to its own international position." Normalization 
of relations occurred in January of 1979. The strongest U.S. 
statement of support for the new relationship and its real 
purpose was delivered by Vice-President Mondale in a speech 
in Peking on August 27 of 1979. He stated: 
Despite the sometimes profound differences 
between our two systems, we are committed 
to joining you to advance our many parallel 
strategies and bilateral interests. Thus, 
any nation which seeks to weaken or isolate 
you in world affairs assumes a stance counter 
to American interests.15 
There were no doubts in Soviet minds what Mondale 
meant by common interests. The Soviet Journal International 
Affairs stated "It is an open secret that these 'interests' 
W.R. Kintner, "A Strategic Triangle of 'Two and a 
Half Powers'," Ofbis, Fall of '79, Vol. 23, p. 526. 
15 Ibid., p. 528. 
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stand for joint action against the USSR and its allies." 
It further elaborates that "the Vice-President's declarations 
to the effect that 'any nation which seeks to weaken or 
isolate' China were a political overture to Peking of a 
clearly anti-Soviet nature." 
For the Soviets the most ominous aspect of the new 
relationship between the U.S. and China, is arm sales to the 
Peoples Republic, which serve to modernize Chinese armed 
forces. The Soviets see the Carter Administration, while 
officially against arms sales to China, "abetting its NATO 
allies signing military deals with the Chinese and allowing 
1 8 
them to sell certain types of modern weaponry." Soviet 
fears in this regard were escalated by U.S. Defense Secretary 
Harold Brown's visit to China in January of 1980 where he 
discussed expanding bilateral relations in military and 
political spheres with high echelon Chinese leaders. Brown 
promised the Chinese a ground-based station for receiving 
and processing various information sent by the U.S. Landsat 
satellite; he also committed the U.S. to help modernize the 
19 Chinese Navy, and supply the Chinese with modern computers. 
In the Soviet mind, this trip of Brown's "is yet another 
W. Kuzmin, "China in Washington's Aggressive Policy," 
International Affairs (Moscow) April 1980, p. 36. 
17 Ibid., p. 36 
18 
No Author, "Peking's Foreign Policy: Hegemonism and 
Alliance with Imperialism," International Affairs (Moscow), 
March 1980, p. 53. 
19 W. Kuzmin, "China in Washington's ,"op. cit., p. 37. 
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indication of the anti-Soviet basis of American Chinese 
„20 
relat xons. 
While the Soviet Union is greatly concerned and 
annoyed with the new U.S.-China relationship, it has not been 
an unexpected development. The Soviets have seen China as a 
de facto ally of the U.S. for several years preceding the 
normalization of relations between Peking and Washington. 
To quote an official Soviet source: 
The Peking leaders and the NATO bosses, 
finding increasing common-ground in their 
hostility to detente ... are drifting 
towards an alliance in which China would 
play the unseemly role of NATO's military 
outpost in the Far East. General Alexander 
Haig, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in 
Europe, said in December '77 that tension 
on the Soviet-Chinese border was 'a clear 
benefit to us in purely military terms.' 
Later he referred to China as 'NATO's 
16th member.'21 
The Soviets saw this statement as indicative of the 
de facto nature of China-U.S. .relations whether formalized 
or not on the part of U.S. leaders. The Chinese view of U.S. 
China relations previous to normalization was taken by the 
Soviets to be represented by an interview which Deng Xiaoping 
gave on May 19, 1978 to UPI in which he "agreed with the 
opinion of the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, M. Mansfield, that 
22 China is 'the Eastern Nato'." 
It is very possible that the U.S. in its attempt at 
using the so-called "China-Card" to preserve stability in the 
W. Kuzmin, 
G. Apalxn, 
p. 54. 
22 
Ibid., p. 54. 
"China in Washington's ....," op. cit., p 
"Peking, the West, and Detente," op. cit., 
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International system has not fully considered the ramifications 
23 
which could result. This ploy could easily backfire. The 
U.S., agreeing publicly to supply some military equipment 
(trucks, satellite station, etc.) to China, is bound to 
strengthen the argument of hard liners inside the Kremlin 
24 
to move on the China problem." One western correspondent 
in Moscow came upon very ominous tidings and reported on the 
possibility of the USSR launching a pre-emptive strike against 
China. 
There are signs that America's decision to 
help China modernize its military forces 
has reinforced all the latent fears of Soviet 
strategic planners about the Chinese threat 
to the Soviet Union ... There has always been 
speculation that the Soviet Union might try to 
move against China before it could become an 
effective nuclear power. In the view of 
some Soviet analysts, these arguments have 
acquired far more urgency now.25 
What tends to reinforce and substantiate this corres-
pondent's report was an official Soviet journal's ominous 
warning less than one month afterwards. "An intensified 
23 
In their haste they may have overlooked an old 
strategic maxim--"What are the intentions of your new partner." 
See W. Kintner, "A Strategic Triangle ....," op. cit., p. 530. 
24 
It is believed in many circles (in the West) that the 
Soviets considered a nuclear strike against certain targets 
inside China in 1969, but were discouraged partly by U.S. dis-
approval. The Soviets considered the moment opportune for what 
might have been from their perspective a "surgical strike", 
i.e. ending China's potential for waging a future nuclear war 
against the Soviet Union. 
25 
Hella Pick, "Options for the Kremlin in West and 
East," in the Guardian, Feb. 10/80. 
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struggle against the plots being hatched by the Peking leaders, 
imperialist reactionaries and militaristic circles in the 
2 fi 
West is naturally becoming particularly urgent." 
A Soviet move at dealing with the China problem is 
dependent on Soviet estimates of how quickly- China can field 
modern armed forces. This timetable is bound to be accelerated 
by any U.S. military aid to China of a substantive nature. 
Also, recent Soviet successes in Ethiopia and Afghanistan may 
create an atmosphere of optimism and confidence on the part 
of Soviet leaders regarding the ability of their armed forces. 
It is possible that Soviet military leaders may be able to 
convince the leaders of the Kremlin that the armed forces 
of the USSR could with a quick move against China "shatter an 
incipient US-PRC-JAP-NATO encirclement before it is too late 
China has actively and .stridently been warning the 
U.S. and its allies of what it perceives as Soviet strategic 
goals—namely, the annexation of Middle Eastern oil and 
neutralization of Western Europe. The Chinese feel the Soviets 
are encircling China by putting pressure on Pakistan and India, 
2 8 
allying with Vietnam and dominating North Korea. The . 
Chinese fear that once the Soviets remove or diminish the 
threat of a Western front they will feel secure in moving against 
China. Vice-Premiere Deng Xiaoping warned "if we really want 
„27 
26 
27 
28 
No Author, "Peking's Foreign ....," op. cit., p. 55. 
W. Kintner, "A Strategic Triangle ....," op. cit. p. 525 
Ibid . , p. 525 . 
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to be able to place curbs on the Polar Bear, the only 
29 
realistic thing for us to do is unite." To that end the 
Chinese are doing their best to draw the U.S. into a firm 
commitment to aid China in what they see as an inevitable 
war with the USSR. To achieve this end the Chinese could seek 
to provide the Soviets with an excuse for an attack which 
would cause severe destruction in China and possibly the loss 
of much Chinese territory. Why would the Chinese pursue such 
a drastic course? They are concerned with the long-term 
danger from the Soviet Union so they might seek to implement 
an old Chinese strategic maxim: 
The classical military planner who has 
read Sun Tzu knows that any action forcing 
an adversary to undertake a plan of action 
prematurely constitutes a sound strategic 
move.30 
The Chinese further realize that a Soviet move against 
China will tilt the balance of power significantly with 
31 detente being shattered and probable Western mobilization. 
The Chinese are confident that in the long run they will beat 
the Soviets because of their greatest strength: manpower. 
The Chinese know that the Soviets are 
weakest where they are strongest - in 
manpower. If the Chinese have sufficient 
time to mobilize and arm that strength, 
they will one day be able to deal with 
the Soviet threat. Hence, they are willing 
to accept a serious, but not mortal, defeat 
now in order to gain a future victory. 
29 
Time Magazine, Feb. 5, 1979. 
30 W. Kintner, "A Strategic Triangle 
32 
op . cit. , 
532 
31 
32 
Ibid., p. 5 33 
Ibid. , p. 533 
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The Chinese by provoking and drawing a Soviet armed 
response, will achieve two goals: (1) a mobilized West; 
(2) drawing the USSR into a long-range protracted war before 
it is able to neutralize its Western front. The Chinese could 
hope to institute the collapse of the Soviet regime along the 
lines depicted in Amalrik's scenario. The Soviets would not 
be in a position of moving most of their forces from Eastern 
Europe to the Far East and time will work against the Soviets 
in a long protracted war with a China being armed by the U.S. 
In effect, China could achieve a posture similar to that which 
they could realize in twenty years time, but which they feel 
the Soviets will move to prevent at a time of their choosing. 
The Chinese strategy then is to prevent the Soviets achieving 
certain goals in the West, thereby giving the Chinese the 
strategic ability to fight a long war with the USSR aiming not 
at a decisive military victory but of effecting the collapse 
of the regime or at least a retreat by the Soviets geographically 
from much of Asia. 
The Soviets are well aware of what the Chinese leaders 
intend. The future in fact may become a race between these 
two states, and which will realize its strategic goals first. 
The above analysis leads to the conclusion that the 
Kremlin is not likely to pass up the chance presented by the 
Soviet "window of opportunity". Indeed, if hardliners can 
convince more moderate elements that their position is as strong 
as it appears, and that there is little chance of any significant 
U.S. response, then the world perhaps can expect to see imminently 
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a war between the Communist giants. During their "window of 
opportunity" the Soviets will have uncontested all-around 
military superiority in Eurasia; they could act during this 
opportune time to avert fighting the long protracted war that 
they may feel China has planned for them in the future. 
Another concern is that if they do have intentions of making 
a "grab" for Middle Eastern oil supplies, China could emerge 
as their dreaded second trout. Also, if Moscow can neutralize 
China, it would achieve a period of grace to deal with internal 
problems without the extreme external threat that China poses. 
The Soviet elite might act to avert a long war in which its 
own internal problems could bring about its collapse. Western 
disunity in the face of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 
and the U.S. hostage-taking incident in Tehran, may serve to 
convince the Soviets that the process of politically dominating 
and effectively neutralizing Western Europe is well in pro-
gress and that China can be taken care of with a minimum of 
Western response. 
Chapter V: Conclusion 
Do not confuse securite the feeling 
of having nothing to fear, and 
surete - the state of having 
nothing to fear. 
Larousse 
We have tried to demonstrate that the combination of 
long run national pessimism plus short term military optimism 
adds up to the possibility of probable Soviet military ex-
pansionism in the 1980s; given the parameters of this "window 
of opportunity" Soviet expansionism could be projected to 
occur before 1986. From the outset of this paper we have held 
that Soviet foreign behaviour increasingly will be a reaction 
to perceived exigencies which threaten the continuation of 
what is in fact a Russian empire. 
The leadership of this empire, we see as: 
Groups seeking self-preservation ... 
driven to a foreign policy conflict ... 
in order to defend themselves against 
the onslaught of domestic rather than 
foreign enemies ...1 
Even our examination of China does not indicate that China will 
be a significant threat without the combination of internal 
problems inside the Soviet Union. The nature of the regime, 
a totalitarian system and the noted propensity of such regimes 
to use international crises to divert attention from internal 
E.B. Haas and A.S. Whiting, Dynamics of International 
Relations (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956), p. 62. 
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2 
problems* serves to reinforce our argument that Soviet expan-
sion in the short term is possible and perhaps probable. 
We have also noted that for the Soviet Union now not 
to seek actively the attenuation of problems (present and 
future), would be a departure in foreign behaviour which has 
been remarkably consistent whether Tsarist or Soviet. Indeed 
the combination of lateral pressures and military superiority 
has provided circumstances which are highly conducive to the 
traditional, historical drive of Moscow's expansionism. 
The Soviet leadership perhaps could reasonably expect 
to achieve certain goals during this "window": firstly, the 
amelioration of critical problems not yet of a crisis pro-
portion, but which can be projected to be so when the "window" 
is closing; and secondly, the prospect of defeating U.S. 
interests over much of the globe (this might become almost 
irresistable for some groups inside the Kremlin). 
We now turn our examination to Soviet strategy as 
evinced by Soviet moves in the Middle East, Africa, and else-
where. Certain probable targets, some being assailed at 
present, and others likely shortly, will be examined and pro-
jections based on these trends will be presented in the form 
of scenarios focused on the Middle East and China. Given our 
level of analysis these scenarios will be consistent with the 
traditional motives for expansion by the Kremlin. 
2 
B. Farrell, "Foreign Politics of Open and Closed 
Political Societies" in Approaches to Comparative and International 
Politics, ed. B. Farrell (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 
1966) , p. 185. 
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Soviet Global Strategy 
Lenin once declared: "The conquest of Europe will take, 
place through Africa;" anyone examining Soviet successes in 
Africa will note the consistency of Soviet foreign policy with 
Lenin's observation sixty years ago. Indeed, Soviet foreign 
policy in much of the third world indicates that the present 
masters inside the Kremlin share Lenin's belief. The first 
formal articulation of Soviet intentions was spelled out at 
the Congress of Oriental Nations held at Baku in 1920 under 
the aegis of the USSR, where the USSR defined its intentions to 
deprive the West of. its raw material sources, thus paralyzing 
it. Since Baku, the West has, in fact, become even more dependent 
in terms of oil and raw materials on external resources which 
appears consistent with Lenin's' blueprint for crippling it. 
For the Soviets to realize a shift in their favour of. 
the "correlation of forces" they have to interdict the resources 
enroute from Africa and Asia to the West; to do so at the source 
is less dangerous than provoking a military confrontation. 
The Soviet leaders in the present are as concerned with the 
"correlation of forces" as Lenin was. This "correlation of 
forces" may most clearly be explained as consisting of, 
... not only those factors which in Western 
terminology are included in the concept of 
'balance of power' but also economic capabilities, 
social stability, and public opinion, i.e., 
elements that, although not military 
in the strict sense of the word, nevertheless 
have considerable bearing on a nation's 
ability to wage war.3 
R. Pipes, "Soviet Global Strategy," in Commentary 
April '80, p. 32. 
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Stalin expanded on Lenin's plan to alter the "correla-
tion of forces" radically in 1921 when he stated: 
If Europe and America may be called the 
front, the non-sovereign nations and 
colonies, with their raw materials, fuel, 
food, and vast stores of human material, 
should be regarded as the rear, the 
reserve of imperialism. In order to win 
a war one must not only triumph at the 
front but also revolutionize the enemy's 
rear, his reserves.^ 
Nixon, in The Real War, warns that the present Soviet 
leadership continues to implement the strategy of Lenin and 
Stalin. He recounts that Soviet President Brezhnev confided 
to Siad Barre, the President of Somalia (at the time an important 
ally in Africa) "our aim is to gain control of the two great 
treasure houses on which the west depends - the energy treasure 
house of the Persian Gulf and the mineral treasure house of 
central and southern Africa." 
Nixon points out that we are in a period in which the 
Soviets are fighting us (and winning) in a massive global Third 
World War, where the U.S. is the chief rival opposing Soviet 
world hegemony. Western Europe and Japan are intermediate 
targets; the war is being fought presently in areas of Africa, 
Asia, and the Middle East, also Latin America. The Soviets 
are risking little but gaining key strategic advantages. 
Richard Pipes notes that the Kremlin needs to reduce 
Richard Nixon, The Real War (New York: Warner Books, 
1980), p. 23. 
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America in the same way Rome had to eliminate Carthage to be 
in an unrivalled position in the international system of that 
time. Because of the U.S. strategic arsenal, a direct assault 
is not as preferable as an indirect assault on the power of 
the U.S.. The Soviet aim is to, 
... detach Europe and Japan from the U.S. 
and pull them into the Soviet orbit: the 
addition of Western Europe's and Japan's 
industrial capabilities to those of the 
Soviet bloc would alter immediately and in 
a most dramatic manner the global correla-
tion of forces in the latter's favour.' 
Pipes uses another analogy to demonstrate the Soviet strategic 
plan: he compares the manner in which medieval castles were 
blockaded, prior to the introduction of gunpowder, to the 
Soviet "systematic effort to cut off the flow of reinforcements 
Q 
and supplies" to Western Europe and Japan. The Soviet strategy 
being to eventually interdict the "reinforcements of manpower 
and materials from the U.S., and supplies in the form of fuel 
9 
and metals from the Middle East and South Africa." The massive 
Soviet build-up of a blue water, capability navy can be under-
stood in terms of the strategic aims of the Kremlin. 
Nine-tenths of U.S. war supplies to the 
European fronts would have to travel by sea, 
so that serious Soviet threat to the North 
Atlantic sea lanes would be bound to have 
significant repercussions on the progress 
of European operations.10 
R. Pipes, "Soviet Global Strategy," op. cit., p. 36. 
8 
10 
Ibid . , p. 36. 
Ibid., p. 37. 
Ibid. , p. 37. 
Ibid . , p. 37. 
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Nixon observes that "if the USSR continues to succeed 
in its penetration of Africa, it will have come a long way in 
its larger strategy of encircling the world 'city' - of 
cutting off the industrialized West from the resources without 
which it cannot survive." 
The Kremlin may feel its highest priority target to 
be the Persian Gulf for two good reasons: (1) the desirability 
acquiring inexpensive oil (2) the potential denial of the 
region's oil to Japan and Western Europe would enable the 
Soviets to neutralize the allies of the U.S., thereby isolating 
the U.S. 
Directed toward these ends, the Kremlin has been 
positioning Soviet forces at principal choke points through 
which Gulf oil is transported to Japan and Europe. From its 
new access to naval bases in Viet Nam, the Soviets are in 
position to reach the Straits of Malacca, the major route for 
oil enroute to Japan. Soviet bases in South Yemen and Ethiopia 
are in place to interdict the Straits of Bab el Mandel which 
guard the entrance to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. The 
recent invasion of Afghanistan brought Soviet forces a hundred 
percent closer (550 kilometers compared to 1100) to the crucial 
Straits of Hormuz. 
Political control over the Gulf region by the Soviets 
would represent a massive shift in the "correlation of forces." 
Soviet political control over the Gulf would result in severe 
political and economic pressures being brought to bear on the 
11 R. Nixon, The Real War, op. cit., p. 24 
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U.S.'s allies: Japan, Britain, the European Community nations, 
resulting probably in their loosening their ties to NATO. 
Africa is of almost equal importance if not in the 
short term certainly in the long run plans of the Kremlin for 
bringing down the Capitalist system. From their successes in 
Angola and Mozambique, represented by friendship treaties, they 
threaten "the whole of what Brezhnev so covetously referred to 
as the 'mineral treasure house of central and southern Africa'. 
Just as the Soviets had their eyes on the oil of Arabia when 
they moved into Somalia and then Ethiopia, they had their 
eyes on these mineral resources when they moved into Angola 
12 
and Mozambique." 
Japan and Europe are dependent on minerals such as 
chrome, platinum, vanadium, and manganese from Zimbabwe, and 
southern Africa, including Namibia and the Union of South Afric 
Soviet support of liberation groups in these countries is 
directed certainly towards interrupting at some point these 
resources so vital to the West. 
The U.S. itself, while not crucially dependent on oil 
supplies from the Gulf, is heavily dependent on minerals from 
southern Africa. Chromium is a key resource for U.S. defense 
industries. The U.S. has to import more than 90% of this 
mineral; the biggest exporter to the U.S. of chrome is South 
Africa, which has 96% of the worlds known reserves together 
1 3 
with Zimbabwe. The USSR would enhance its position vis a. vis 
the global "correlation of forces" just by cutting off this 
12 
Richard Nixon, The Real War, op. cit., p. 28. 
82 
resource permanently to the U.S. 
Tactics 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is a good indication 
that the long term strategy of shifting in their favour the 
"correlation of forces" takes precedence over grain supplies, 
advanced technology and cheap credit from the West, which 
alleviates the inefficiencies of the Soviet economic system. 
For the masters of the Kremlin to pull off the plan formalized 
at Baku in 1920 they must act while the balance of forces is 
most favourable to them. The invasion of Afghanistan puts them 
that much closer to a position from which they can cripple the 
economies of Japan and West Europe and weaken that of the U.S.: 
by interrupting the flow of oil supplies from the Middle East. 
The Soviets have removed Afghanistan as a "buffer" 
state between Soviet armed forces and the West's vital oil lanes. 
The takeover of Afghanistan places the USSR one country closer 
to achieving a long sought goal—a warm water port on the Arabian 
Sea. From such a port the Soviets could exert almost irresistabl 
political coercion over the nations of the Gulf, and if the 
occasion warrants, military interdiction of the flow of oil. 
Former President Nixon warns that the invasion was part 
of a p at tern: 
It is a pattern of ceaseless building by the 
Soviets toward a position of overwhelming 
military force, while using subversion and 
proxy troops, and now even its own, to take 
over one country after another, until they 
are in a position to conquer or Finlandize 
the world.14 
14 R. Nixon, The Real War, op. cit., p. 12 
It is interesting to note that many of the Soviet 
invasion troops in Afghanistan are on the Western border facing 
Iran, "far from the counter-insurgency operations in the North, 
East and central regions. The biggest military airbase in 
Afghanistan has been established at Shindand (near the border 
with Iran) where four strike air squadrons and some 60 MI-60 
transport helicopters are based." Soviet expansion at Iran's 
expense, given its weakened armed forces and the dubious nature 
of a U.S. response, can be seen as a real probability. The 
Soviet Union has been quick to present nationalities claims 
as a pretext for expansion, in the recent past. Certainly 
"there are still large numbers of Azerbaidzhanis and other 
national minorities under Tehran rule who could form the basis 
for demands to extend the Soviet frontier, despite Lenin's 
repudiation of Tsarist conquests." 
Perhaps the more likely basis of any Soviet military 
intervention in Iran by the Soviet Union could be the in-
vocation of the 1921 Friendship Treaty. The Soviet Union has 
invoked article 6, which provides for Soviet military inter-
vention, before in Iran (i.e., the partial occupation of Iran 
in 1941), and "any third party threatening the independence of 
Iran and the security of the USSR," justifies Soviet action. 
15„ Moscow Exploits Iran Crisis," in Soviet Analyst 
Vol. 9 #8, April 16 '80, p. 1 
Ibid . , p. 2 
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It is easy to imagine several plausible scenarios 
whereby the USSR could invoke this clause, thereby legiti-
mizing Soviet expansion at the expense of Iran. Two in 
particular are: (1) a U.S. military action against Iran in 
connection with the hostages; (2) an attack on Iran by Iraq 
(with the approval and support of the USSR). In either 
eventuality the Soviets have positioned themselves to inter-
cede "56,000 Soviet combat troops backed up with 850 tanks and 
1,660 armored personnel carriers now reported on Afghanistan's 
18 
western border" facing Iran. 
It is likely that the lack of a concerted Western 
response over their invasion of Afghanistan is serving to 
support the advocation by hardliners in the Kremlin that the 
time is ripe for the "liberation" of Iran from external aggres-
sion. Russian regimes, whether Tsarist or Soviet, are not noted 
for their propensity to let opportune occasions for expansion 
to elude them. 
Soviet intentions regarding Saudi Arabia are no secret 
to the Saudis. As Nixon warns: 
Saudi Arabia is threatened: The Horn of 
Africa forms a claw with its pincers 
around the Arabian peninsula; the 
Ethiopian highlands look down menacingly 
on the desert sands of Saudi Arabia, 
just across the Red Sea.19 
Soviet moves in both the Horn and in South Yemen have 
convinced the Saudis that Soviet intentions are to exert 
18„ Moscow Exploits Iran Crisis," op. cit., p. 1. 
19 R. Nixon, The Real War, op. cit., p. 27 
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political pressure on the kingdom, with the goal of transforming 
the kingdom into a people's republic, with a pro-Soviet 
orientation. The crisis in short term Soviet energy pro-
duction makes Saudi oil a very attractive prize. What the 
Saudis and Western nations dependent on Saudi oil fear is a 
Soviet-backed coup, resulting in the kingdom and its resources 
joining the Soviet led East European economic system. 
The Saudis have resisted normalizing relations with the 
USSR with this real fear in their minds, however, apparent 
Western weakness in the face of Soviet successes in South Yemen 
and the Horn, could lead to the Saudis being forced to normalize 
their relations with the Kremlin. Such a course would be 
embarked on with the hope of thwarting an immediate threat 
from the Soviet Union. Such a change in Saudi foreign policy, 
induced by Soviet adventurism in the region, would strike a 
hard tactical blow at the West. 
Africa has seen the Soviets make gains at the expense 
of the West, virtually unopposed. Angola alone was a significant 
chess piece taken from the West in the global game of chess. 
The Soviets have access now to the vast mineral resources, the 
oil of Cabinda, but equally important are in a position to cut 
off these resources to the West. From naval and air bases in 
Angola, the Soviets can patrol the southern Atlantic, cutting 
off supplies of oil and minerals at will, bound for Europe. 
Africa offers still more attractive targets for the 
Soviets, particularly Nigeria (oil), South Africa (gold, 
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uranium, rare metals), and Zaire (cobalt, manganese,copper). 
The Soviets, through their facilities already in place, 
have a tactical advantage over the U.S. in terms of further 
intervention at the expense of the U.S. and its allies. "The 
combined effects of regional changes, the Soviet Union's own 
growth in military capacity for regional intervention, and the 
U.S. post-Viet Nam wariness about military responses and inter-
21 
vention make Soviet interventions easier." 
Given these developments, the Soviet plan formulated 
at Baku in 1920 appears to be near completion. The Soviet 
Union would be in a position to control practically the whole 
of Black Africa, in the event of a war with the West; this is 
a significant tactical advantage. The Soviets could reasonably 
hope to be able to choke the West into submission by denying 
the oil and resources needed to wage war. As one observer 
noted ominously: 
Every 20 minutes 50,000 tons of oil is 
shipped along the Cape route. Is the 
USSR to achieve definitive control of 
this route vital to the West?22 
The importance of Africa cannot be underestimated, if 
"the Soviets one day were to control it and her inexhaustible 
mineral resources, they would be unquestionably masters of the 
20 
H. Bienen, "Perspectives on Soviet Intervention in 
Africa," Political Science Quarterly, p. 39. 
21 Ibid . , p. 36 . 
2 2A. Coste-Floret, "The Great Design of the U.S.S.R, 
in Africa," in Atlantic Community Quarterly, p. 275. 
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world economy, while at the same time it would be easy for 
23 them to cut Western lines of communication." 
Soviet moves in Africa represent the battles being 
fought by the USSR against the U.S. for hegemony over Europe--
a war that has seen the USSR acquire tactical advantages vir-
tually unopposed by its rival, the U.S. 
Possible Scenarios 
(I) Middle East 
Given that the Kremlin is aware that it need not invade 
militarily Western Europe to gain control over it, a war 
between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces is not likely in the 1980s 
(indeed if it ever was). The Soviets merely have to acquire 
control over the Persian Gulf to control Western Europe. To 
that end, it is probable that the Kremlin has a plan which 
would provide for the acquisition of free oil and secondly, 
the political gains to be had from such a move, i.e. military 
intervention in the Gulf. 
A quick move through Northern Iran to an occupation of 
Iranian oil fields, and possibly other Persian Gulf fields, 
including those of Iraq, would give the Soviet Union the leverage 
to put heavy political pressure on Western Europe and Japan. 
This move by the Soviets could -easily be the result of several 
opportunities (some already discussed) but one is increasingly 
probable--that of the death of Khomeini producing a collapse of 
authority in Iran. The Soviets, of course, would be Invited 
23 
A. Coste-Floret, "The Great Design of the U.S.S.R. in 
Africa," op. cit., p. 275. 
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in by any of several sources inside Iran, similar to the 
request by Amin in Afghanistan for Soviet help. The U.S. would 
not be in a position to threaten to escalate the conflict by 
using nuclear forces with any great deal of confidence. The 
U.S., while it is strategically vulnerable to a first strike, 
cannot afford to see the conflict escalate to the brink. The 
use of American paratroopers would be futile without the support 
of armour. The Soviets, by threatening to interdict oil supplies 
to West Europe and Japan, can reasonably expect these nations 
to stay out of the limited war which could ensue between the 
USSR and the U.S. 
The USSR might avoid occupying Saudi Arabia, thereby 
leaving the U.S. the facesaving gesture of occupying it under 
the rationale of preventing further Soviet advancement. 
The Soviets would then have achieved significant results 
in terms of self-aggrandizement at the expense of the U.S.-- -
such as: (1) the breakup of NATO; (2) the isolation of the U.S. 
to North America; (3) securing Soviet Western borders in the 
event of a war in the east with China; (4) the means to exert 
political changes in West Europe and Japan, such as moving 
Communist party members into cabinet decision making, the 
eventual result being the transformation of these nations into 
'Peoples' Republics'; (5) time and resources to overcome 
economic dislocations inside the Soviet Union; (6) probable 
long term security and stability for their empire. 
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II China 
A move by the Kremlin against China is probably heavily 
dependent on the success of the first scenario, at least in 
some similar manner. The possibility exists that China could 
induce a Soviet attack before Moscow is able to secure its 
western border, but in lieu of that the following scenario is 
pos sible . 
The Kremlin worried that China for any of several reasons 
might provoke a war in the future; a Kremlin well aware that 
Japanese and Western help hastens the day when the Chinese could 
fight such a war on comparable terms—will decide to act against 
China while the "correlation of forces" is in its favour.- The 
Kremlin moves to take care of China before a real alliance can 
emerge between an alarmed West, a fearful Japan, and a hostile 
China. If the Soviets were to pull off the partial neutrali-
zation of West Europe and Japan, they could probably enhance 
this process by the reduction of China. 
The Kremlin acting during its "window of opportunity" 
may not hesitate to use a preemptive nuclear strike on China, 
followed by the "balkanization" of China. The Soviets, with 
quick armored thrusts, could "liberate" Sinkiang, Manchuria, 
inner Mongolia, perhaps Tibet. The rest of China would then 
be offset by client regimes of the USSR. 
The reduction of China would provide the period of 
grace the Kremlin needs to deal with its internal problems; 
without this period of grace, the regime could collapse internally, 
given a long war with China and the West. 
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We present these scenarios not as an exercise in 
crystal ball gazing, but rather to point out that such possi-
bilities are actual options available to the Kremlin during its 
transitory advantage over the United States. 
Summary 
The conclusions we must draw from our analysis are truly 
alarming. The arguments of Nixon, Pipes, Luttwak, Nitze, and 
Rostow which we sought to strengthen and support by incorpo-
rating them with an examination of "lateral pressures" indicates 
that the true gravity of the situation, for the West, is even 
more dangerous than any of these publicists singularly points 
out. Indeed, we see the probability that the Kremlin will act 
on the same basis as it does in General Hackett's scenario for 
the 3rd World War, where short term military optimism and long 
term national pessimism leads the Soviet leadership to war. 
We disagree however with his venue; Soviet military expansion is 
more likely to occur in the Middle East and Far East where the 
risks will be less and the results about the same. In short, 
we see the Soviet elite embarking on a plan which could lead 
it to eventual world hegemony, and the maintenance of the Russian 
empire in the face of the most potent ideology of the 20th 
century, "nationalism". 
Appendix 
We would like to sketch briefly Choucri's and North's 
argument of how lateral pressures lead to conflict in foreign 
policy behaviour, in order to see if our historical analysis 
of what we feel to be increasing lateral pressures corres-
ponds to their model, thus perhaps serving to support our 
analysis of probable trends in Soviet foreign behaviour in 
the '80s. 
In their model they argue that leaders operate to 
minimize shortages such as resources needed, gaps between ex-
pectations and realizations when climbing productivity tapers 
off, and the gap between the resource or growth rate of one's 
own country and that of a competitor. Further, they point 
out that the combination of a growing population and develop-
ing technology will place rapidly increasing demands upon the 
nation's resources, which will result in internally-generated 
pressures. The more this pressure increases, the more likely 
leaders will seek to extend national activities beyond the 
country's borders. When a state intersects with another of 
similar high capability in extending their national interests, 
there is a strong probability that the competition will assume 
military dimensions. They see major wars emerging through a 
two-step process: internally generated pressures, and, secondly, 
reciprocal comparison. Therefore the internal demands of the 
N. Choucri, and R. North, "Dynamics of International 
Conflict," in R. Tanter and R. Ullman (eds.) Theory and Policy 
in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 
1972). 
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society combine multiplicatively to produce what are termed 
"lateral pressures." They see leaders pressured to undertake 
activities increasingly removed from the original boundaries 
of the society, and that empires with high lateral pressures 
will tend to extend their influence in search of raw materials. 
The greater the lateral pressures generated within this state 
or empire, the greater the tendency will be to push its 
interests into territories and states with lower levels of 
capability. They see the desire to protect national interests 
in far-off areas leading to wars against low-capability 
societies. When two states of high capabilities and high 
lateral pressure tendencies extend their interests and psycho-
political borders outward, there is a strong probability that 
sooner or later the opposing perimeters of interest will 
intersect at one or more points. They argue, there is often 
the feeling on the part of the aspiring, but still weaker power, 
that it is being "encircled" by rivals. When this happens, 
they see the competition becoming more serious. They see the 
competition leading to non-violent conflict, or to an arms 
race, which increases the chances of war. Choucri and North 
posit a continuum from one set of dynamics to another (separated 
2 
by break points): expansion to competition to crisis to war. 
In our analysis we find that lateral pressure is exerted 
on the Soviet elite with respect to the "Legitimacy Problem" 
because the CPSU has no mandate to govern unless it can 
N. Choucri and R.C. North, "Dynamics of International 
Conflict," op. cit. 
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continue to pass itself off as the vanguard of the revolution. 
Further, that it must carry the conflict and struggle to other 
states with the appearance of winning. We therefore find the 
regime must continue to create an atmosphere of tension 
internationally. The Soviet elite must maintain this posture 
in order to have a basis for its de^  facto role of imperial 
master in Eastern Europe and of the non-Russian nationalities 
inside the Soviet Union. Under increasing pressure the Soviet 
elite are forced to seek external expansionism, the historic 
course of Tsarist governments seeking to secure the empire. 
Thus the Soviet elite are under lateral pressure to create 
... a world from which private property 
in the means of production has been banished 
and the constituent states are, with minor 
variation, copies of the Soviet state. It 
is only in a world so fashioned that the 
elite ruling Soviet Russia would feel secure 
and comfortable.3 
Economic factors leading to lateral pressures are caused 
by two factors, primarily (1) a scarcity of energy resources 
in the 1980s and (2) the inability to liberalize the system. 
The Choucri-North model appears to be applicable to the 
Soviet Union heading into the 1980s. Its leaders are con-
fronted with a gap in available resources (i.e. their short 
term energy crisis) to its real rival the United States and its 
interests are intersecting with those of China in Asia. The 
competition between the Communist giants could easily assume 
3 
Richard Pipes, "Soviet Global Strategy," in Commentary, 
April 1980, p. 33. 
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military dimensions. It is possible that the Soviet elite 
will move to a war with China based both on internally 
generated pressures, and on a reciprocal comparison of what 
China will be in the future. 
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